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I. INTRODUCTION
The Court of Criminal Appeal (CCA) plays a crucial role in
shaping criminal law, criminal procedure and sentencing. The
significance of its judgments reaches beyond the courts over which it
exercises appellate jurisdiction. In this context, the rulings of the
Court on the interpretation of the law and on the principles, policies
and methodology of sentencing are as relevant to the District Court
as they are to the courts that try indictable offences. In turn, District
Judges can properly expect guidance on these matters from the
jurisprudence of the CCA. 
This paper reviews judgments delivered by the CCA between
1 January 2002 and 31 July 2004. The purpose of the survey is to
sketch the general themes in the case law and to identify the
principles invoked by the Court. The subject matter of this review is
the documented decisions of the CCA in the relevant period,
consisting of reserved judgments, approved ex tempore judgments
and unapproved ex tempore judgments.1 The first two categories of
judgment may be cited in court and accordingly they enjoy the
authority that is attributed to decisions of the CCA. In general,
unapproved ex tempore judgments are not cited and they lack any
real weight as precedents. Moreover, the manner in which such
judgments are recorded is often uneven and hence they are not
especially reliable. Nevertheless, for several reasons, it is useful to
2005]
A Review of the Jurisprudence of the Court of
Criminal Appeal 2002-2004:
Principles and General Themes
213
* School of Law, University of Limerick.  The authors were facilitated with access to the Office
of the Court of Criminal Appeal. They wish to express their gratitude to Ms Geraldine
Manners, Registrar of the Court of Criminal Appeal, and her staff for their support and
unfailing courtesy. A version of this paper was delivered to the National Judicial Conference
in November 2004. The authors are grateful for the comments and suggestions made by
members of the judiciary. Any errors are exclusively those of the authors.
1 Judgments that were not recorded in written form were not considered. The reasons for
undocumented judgments include faulty audio recording of hearings, delays in the receipt of
written judgments and judgments missing from the files.
include the unapproved judgments in this review.2 First, those
judgments form a significant portion of the output of the Court.
Second, such judgments provide evidence of the general trends in the
jurisprudence. Third, occasionally an unapproved judgment may
contain a novel point or judicial pronouncement. In any event, a
more complete picture of the work of the Court is provided when the
full corpus of available judgments is considered.
The current study reviewed 446 judgments, of which 174
were delivered in 2002, 168 in 2003 and 104 between 1 January and
31 July 2004.3 Reserved judgments were delivered in 82 cases, while
131 approved ex tempore judgments and 233 unapproved ex
tempore judgments were handed down in the review period. Appeals
against conviction and appeals against sentence accounted for the
majority of cases. Other cases that were dealt with by the Court
include appeals by the Director of Public Prosecutions against
leniency of sentence, bail applications and applications for section
29 certificates account. Table 1 sets out the details of the judgments
that have been reviewed.
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2 Unapproved ex tempore judgments are identified in this paper in the following manner:
People (DPP) v Kelly 21 March 2002 (ex temp).
3 The data presented by the authors in this paper (the UL data) differs from that provided by
the Court of Criminal Appeal office (the CCA data). The CCA data discloses that 556 cases
were disposed of in 2002 and 2003 (figures for 2004 are currently unavailable): of those cases
226 are recorded as having been abandoned, leaving a total of 330 cases. The UL total for the
same period is 342 cases.  In the main, the CCA data records inputs (cases initiated) while the
UL data reflects outputs (judgments delivered). The principal methodological differences are:
(i) CCA practice is to count each applicant/appellant once irrespective of the number of
hearings involved in his/her case; the UL data counts each judgment delivered. It is conceivable
that four judgments might be delivered in relation to one set of proceedings: the CCA data will
record one case while the UL data will record four judgments. (ii) DPP appeals and miscarriage
of justice cases are included in the UL data but are excluded from the CCA data.
Table 1:  Judgments of Court of Criminal Appeal Jan 2002-July
2004
Appeals against conviction, appeals against sentence, appeals
against both conviction and sentence and DPP appeals accounted for
381 cases. The outcomes of those appeals are listed in Table 2. In all,
just short of half of all appeals were successful: appeals were allowed
in 47% of the cases reviewed and rejected in 50% of such cases. 
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2002 2003 Jan-July Total
2004
Appeal against 45 (26%) 31 (18%) 30 (28%) 106 (24%)
conviction
Appeal against 77 (44%) 89 (53%) 36 (34%) 202 (45%)
sentence
Appeal against 5 (3%) 11 (7%) 8 (8.5%) 24 (5%)
conviction and
sentence
DPP appeal: 18 (10.5%) 17 (10%) 14 (13%) 49 (11%)
leniency of
sentence
Activated 1 (0.5%) 1 (0.5%) 1 (1%) 3 (0.75%)
suspended
sentences
Suspension of 1 (0.5%) - - - - 1 (0.25%)
balance sentence
Suspension of 1 (0.5%) - - - - 1 (0.25%)
conditions
Restoration of - - 1 (0.5%) - - 1 (0.25%)
licence
Section 29 9 (5%) 4 (2%) 7 (7.5%) 20 (4.5%)
certificate
Section 9 2 (1%) - - - - 2 (0.5%)
certificate
New evidence - - - - 2 (2%) 2 (0.5%)
Bail application 15 (9%) 9 (5%) 4 (4%) 28 (6.25%)
pending appeal
Variation of bail - - 1 (1%) - - 1 (0.25%)
conditions
To amend on - - 1 (0.5%) - - 1 (0.25%)
grounds of appeal
Disclosure - - 1 (0.5%) - - 1 (0.25%)
application
Copy/transcript - - 1 (0.5%) - - 1 (0.25%)
application
Application for - - - - 1 (1%) 1 (0.25%)
legal aid
Application for - - - - 1 (1%) 1 (0.25%)
costs
Omitted from - - 1 (0.5%) - - 1 (0.25%)
judgment
Total 174 168 107 446
Table 2: Outcome of Appeals Jan 2002-July 2004
Further analysis reveals that, in general, appeals against
conviction were less likely to succeed than appeals against sentence.
Appeals against conviction were allowed in 42% of cases and
refused in 57% (see Table 3). On the other hand, there was a 49%
success rate where appeals against sentence were concerned (see
Table 4). The same pattern is reflected in the results of appeals
against both conviction and sentence. Appeals were allowed in 42%
of these cases, with more appeals against sentence (25%) being
successful than appeals against conviction (17%)(See Table 5).
Table 3: Appeals Against Conviction Only Jan 2002-July 2004
Table 4: Appeals against Sentence Only Jan 2002-July 2004
Table 5: Appeals against Conviction and Sentence Jan 2002-July 2004
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2002 2003 Jan-Jul 2004 Total
Appeal allowed 80 (55%) 66 (45%) 34 (39%) 180 (47%)
Appeal refused 64 (44%) 77 (52%) 50 (57%) 191 (50%)
Other 1 (1%) 5 (3%) 5 (4%) 10 (3%)
Total 145 148 88 381
2002 2003 Jan-July 2004 Total
Appeal allowed 23 (51%) 9 (29%) 12 (40%) 44 (42%)
Appeal refused 22 (49%) 22 (71%) 17 (57%) 61 (57%)
Other - - 1 (3%) 1 (1%)
Total 45 31 30 106
2002 2003 Jan-July2004 Total
Appeal allowed 43 (56%) 42 (47%) 13 (36%) 98 (49%)
Appeal refused 34 (44%) 43 (48%) 20 (56%) 97 (48%)
Other - 4 (4%) 3 (8%) 7 (3%)
Total 77 89 36 202
2002 2003 Jan-July 2004 Total
Appeal allowed 11 (61%) 9 (53%) 8 (57%) 28 (57%)
Appeal refused 6 (33%) 7 (41%) 6 (43%) 19 (39%)
Preliminary issue 1 (6%) 1 (6%) - 2 (4%)
Total 18 17 14 49
2002 2003 Jan-Jul 2004 Total
Appeal allowed 80 (55%) 66 (45%) 34 (39%) 180 (47%)
Appeal refused 64 (44%) 77 (52%) 50 (57%) 191 (50%)
Other 1 (1%) 5 (3%) 5 (4%) 10 (3%)
Total 145 148 88 381
2002 2003 Jan-July 2004 Total
Appeal allowed 23 (51%) 9 (29%) 12 (40%) 44 (42%)
Appeal refused 22 (49%) 22 (71%) 17 (57%) 61 (57%)
Other - - 1 (3%) 1 (1%)
Total 45 31 30 106
2002 2003 Jan-July2004 Total
Appeal allowed 43 (56%) 42 (47%) 13 (36%) 98 (49%)
Appeal refused 34 (44%) 43 (48%) 20 (56%) 97 (48%)
Other - 4 (4%) 3 (8%) 7 (3%)
Total 77 89 36 202
2002 2003 Jan-July 2004 Total
Appeal allowed 11 (61%) 9 (53%) 8 (57%) 28 (57%)
Appeal refused 6 (33%) 7 (41%) 6 (43%) 19 (39%)
Preliminary issue 1 (6%) 1 (6%) - 2 (4%)
Total 18 17 14 49
2002 2003 Jan-July 2004 Total
Conviction appeal allowed 1 3 - 4 (17%)
Sentence appeal allowed 2 3 1 6 (25%)
Sub-total: successful 3 6 1 10 (42%)
appeals
Refused both appeals 1 4 2 7 (29%)
Conviction appeal refused; - - 4 4 (17%)
to hear sentence later
Conviction appeal refused; - 1 1 2 (8%)
sentence appeal abandoned
Preliminary issues 1 - - 1 (4%)
Sub-total: unsuccessful 2 5 7 14 (58%)
appeals
Total 5 11 8 24
2002 2003 Jan-July 2004 Total
Charge on corroboration 8 1 2 11
Charge – other errors 3 3 8 14
Inadmissible evidence 2 1 - 3
New evidence 2 1 1 4
Perverse verdict 1 - - 1
Breach of D’s testamentary 3 1 - 4
shield
E
In summary, appeals against conviction, appeals against
sentence and appeals against conviction and sentence accounted for
332 of the judgments reviewed. Convictions were overturned in 48
cases and sentences were varied in 104 cases, representing a
combined success rate of approximately 46%.
Of the 48 successful appeals against conviction, retrials were
ordered in 41 cases. The principal grounds on which such appeals
were successful are listed in Table 6. Slightly over 50% of those
appeals were allowed on the grounds relating to the charge to the
jury, with charges relating to corroboration accounting for almost
half of that figure. 
Table 6: Principal grounds for successful appeals against conviction
Jan 2002-July 2004
The outcomes of successful appeals against sentence are
listed in Table 7. The preponderance of those cases involved a
reduction in sentence of between one and three years or the
suspension of all or part of the sentence. It emerges that the
difficulties most frequently identified by the CCA were insufficient
mitigation, sentences that were disproportionate or offended the
totality principle, the appellant’s exceptional circumstances and
errors in the consecutive element. Table 8 lists the principal grounds
on which appeals against sentence were successful.
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2002 2003 Jan-July 2004 Total
Co viction appeal allowed 1 3 - 4 (17%)
Sentence appeal allowed 2 3 1 6 (25%)
Sub-total: successful 3 6 1 10 (42%)
appeals
Refused both appeals 1 4 2 7 (29%)
Conviction appeal refused; - - 4 4 (17%)
to hear sentence later
Conviction appeal refused; - 1 1 2 (8%)
sentence appeal abandoned
Preliminary issues 1 - - 1 (4%)
Sub-total: unsuccessful 2 5 7 14 (58%)
appeals
Total 5 11 8 24
2002 2003 Jan-July 2004 Total
Charge on corroboration 8 1 2 11
Charge – other errors 3 3 8 14
Inadmissible evidence 2 1 - 3
New evidence 2 1 1 4
Perverse verdict 1 - - 1
Breach of D’s testamentary 3 1 - 4
shield
Errors with indictment 3 - - 3
Direction wrongly refused  1 - - 1
Provocation defence - - 1 1
wrongly refused
Procedural errors 1 5 - 6
Total 24 12 10 48
2002 2003 Jan-July 2004 Total
Reduced by 12 yrs - 1 (2%) - 1 (1%)
Reduced by 10 yrs - 1 (2%) - 1 (1%)
Reduced by 8 yrs - 1 (2%) - 1 (1%)
Reduced by 6 yrs - 1 (2%) 2 (14%) 3 (3%)
Reduced by 5 yrs 2 (5%) - - 2 (2%)
Reduced by 4 yrs 1 (2%) 3 (5%) 1 (7%) 5 (3%)
Reduced by 3 yrs 3 (7%) 7 (17%) - 10 (10%)
Reduced by 2 yrs 9 (21%) 8 (17%) 3 (21%) 20 (19%)
Reduced by 1 yr 6 (14%) 6 (15%) 1 (7%) 13 (13%)
Unclear reduction of 2 (2%) 3 (5%) 1 (7%) 6 (6%)
custodial
Bal nce of sentence 7 (12%) 1 (2%) 1 (7%) 9 (9%)
suspended
Introduced/varied 10 (23%) 9 (22%) 3 (21%) 22 (21%)
suspension
Changed sequence 2 (5%) 2 (5%) 1 (7%) 5 (5%)
Sentence backdated - - 1 (7%) 1 (1%)
Disqualified interregnum 1 (2%) - - 1 (1%)
Custodial to community 1 (2%) - - 1 (1%)
service
Custodial to compensation 1 (2%) - - 1 (1%)
Reduced fine - 1 (2%) - 1 (1%)
Increased 8 yr sentence - 1 (2%) - 1 (1%)
by 1 day
Total 45 45 14 104
Table 7: Outcome of Successful Sentence Appeals Jan 2002-July
2004
DPP appeals against leniency of sentence accounted for 49
cases. The appeals were allowed in 28 cases, representing a 57%
success rate (see Table 9). In the bulk of successful DPP appeals the
CCA increased the sentence by between one and two years or altered
a suspension imposed by the trial court (see Table 10). The most
frequently given reasons for allowing DPP appeals were that the
sentence was unduly lenient or that the case warranted a custodial
sentence (see Table 11).
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Errors with indictment 3 - - 3
Direction wrongly refused  1 - - 1
Provocation defence - - 1 1
wrongly refused
Procedural errors 1 5 - 6
Total 24 12 10 48
2002 2003 Jan-July 2004 Total
Reduced by 12 yrs - 1 (2%) - 1 (1%)
Reduced by 10 yrs - 1 (2%) - 1 (1%)
Reduced by 8 yrs - 1 (2%) - 1 (1%)
Reduced by 6 yrs - 1 (2%) 2 (14%) 3 (3%)
Reduced by 5 yrs 2 (5%) - - 2 (2%)
Reduced by 4 yrs 1 (2%) 3 (5%) 1 (7%) 5 (3%)
Reduced by 3 yrs 3 (7%) 7 (17%) - 10 (10%)
Reduced by 2 yrs 9 (21%) 8 (17%) 3 (21%) 20 (19%)
Reduced by 1 yr 6 (14%) 6 (15%) 1 (7%) 13 (13%)
Unclear reduction of 2 (2%) 3 (5%) 1 (7%) 6 (6%)
custodial
Balance of sentence 7 (12%) 1 (2%) 1 (7%) 9 (9%)
suspended
Introduced/varied 10 (23%) 9 (22%) 3 (21%) 22 (21%)
suspension
Changed sequence 2 (5%) 2 (5%) 1 (7%) 5 (5%)
Sentence backdated - - 1 (7%) 1 (1%)
Disqualified interregnum 1 (2%) - - 1 (1%)
Custodial to community 1 (2%) - - 1 (1%)
service
Custodial to compensation 1 (2%) - - 1 (1%)
Reduced fine - 1 (2%) - 1 (1%)
Increased 8 yr sentence - 1 (2%) - 1 (1%)
by 1 day
Total 45 45 14 104
Table 8: Principal grounds for successful sentence appeals Jan 2002-
July 2004
DPP appeals against leniency of sentence accounted for 49
cases. The appeals were allowed in 28 cases, representing a 57%
success rate (see Table 9). In the bulk of successful DPP appeals the
CCA increased the sentence by between one and two years or altered
a suspension imposed by the trial court (see Table 10). The most
frequently given reasons for allowing DPP appeals were that the
sentence was unduly lenient or that the case warranted a custodial
sentence (see Table 11).
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2002 2003 Jan-July 2004 Total
Insufficient mitigation 13 17 5 35
Consecutive element 3 4 - 7
incorrect
Opinion evidence wrongly 3 - - 3
considered
Irrelevant considerations - 1 - 1
D’s exceptional 8 1 - 9
circumstances
Disproportionate/ 10 10 2 22
offending totality
Error not suspending part 1 - - 1
Sentence wrongly set 1 1
higher as fully suspended
Error imposing 1 - - 1
interregnum
Sentence not related 2 - - 2
to co-defendants
Reliance on Parole 1 2 - 3
Board review
Period of suspension longer
than sentence itself 1 - - 1
Error re manslaughter   - 1 4 5
categories
Error re starting point of - 2 - 2
sentence
Error re maximum - 1 - 1
Miscellaneous 1 5 2 8
No details given 1 1 - 2
Total 45 45 14 104
2002 2003 Jan-July 2004 Total
Removed/adjusted 3 5 1 9
suspension
Increased sentence by 3 1 4 8
1-2 yrs
Increased sentence by 2 - - 2
Added co secutive lement 1 1 1 3
Re-imposed same sentence - 1 - 1
Imposed totally different - 1 - 1
sentence
Affirmed sentence, 1 - - 1
removed review
Converted fine to custodial 1 - - 1
Sentencing adjourned - - 1 1
Original sentence - - 1 1
unidentified
Total 11 9 8 28
Table 9: DPP Appeals Jan 2002-July 2004
Table 10: Outcome of Successful DPP Appeals Jan 2002-July 2004
Table 11: Principal grounds for successful DDP appeals Jan 2002-
July 2004
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2002 2003 Jan-July2004 Total
Appeal allowed 43 (56%) 42 (47%) 13 (36%) 98 (49%)
Appeal refused 34 (44%) 43 (48%) 20 (56%) 97 (48%)
Other - 4 (4%) 3 (8%) 7 (3%)
Total 77 89 36 202
2002 2003 Jan-July 2004 Total
Appeal allowed 11 (61%) 9 (53%) 8 (57%) 28 (57%)
Appeal refused 6 (33%) 7 (41%) 6 (43%) 19 (39%)
Preliminary issue 1 (6%) 1 (6%) - 2 (4%)
Total 18 17 14 49
to co-defendants
Reliance on Parole 1 2 - 3
Board review
Period of suspension longer
than sentence itself 1 - - 1
Error re manslaughter   - 1 4 5
categories
Error re starting point of - 2 - 2
sentence
Error re maximum - 1 - 1
Miscellaneous 1 5 2 8
No details given 1 1 - 2
Total 45 45 14 104
2002 2003 Jan-July 2004 Total
Removed/adjusted 3 5 1 9
suspension
Increased sentence by 3 1 4 8
1-2 yrs
Increased sentence by 2 - - 2
Added consecutive element 1 1 1 3
Re-imposed same sentence - 1 - 1
Imposed totally different - 1 - 1
sentence
Affirmed sentence, 1 - - 1
removed review
Converted fine to custodial 1 - - 1
Sentencing adjourned - - 1 1
Original sentence - - 1 1
unidentified
Total 11 9 8 28
2002 2003 Jan-July 2004 Total
Wrongly treated as - - 1 1
first offence
Incorrect deduction 1 - - 1
for mitigation 
Wrongly reduced - - 1 1
for consecutivity
No account taken 1 1 1 3
of consecutivity
Case warranted custodial - 5 - 5
sentence
Aggravating factors 3 1 - 4
unrecognised
Insufficient weight to
victim impact - 1 - 1
Generally unduly lenient 6 1 5 12
Total 11 9 8 28
The statistics provide an indication of what is happening in
the CCA but it is important not to be seduced them. Those data tend
to conceal more nuanced patterns of behaviour. In many cases where
an appeal is successful, the appellant will have succeeded on one
ground only with the Court upholding the trial judge on the other
issues that were challenged in the appeal. Moreover, a successful
appeal against sentence might involve a comparatively small
alteration to the sentences imposed by the trial judge or the
suspension of part of a custodial sentence. Indeed, in one case a
sentence was increased by one day to ensure that the appellant could
avail of an opportunity to apply to the Parole Board.4 In another
case, the CCA allowed an appeal against sentence on the grounds
that the trial judge had applied the wrong methodology.  However,
when the correct methodology was adopted, a sentence of the same
duration was imposed.5
Before proceeding to a detailed evaluation of the judgments,
some general observations, based on impressions gained from a
reading of the judgments rather than a statistical analysis, are
warranted. First, it is clear from the judgments that many CCA
decisions are primarily based on the particular facts of the case and
do not resolve more general issues of law or procedure. A reading of
such judgments must take account of this feature and many of the
judgments reviewed involve the application of settled law rather than
the enunciation of uncertain points of law. This factor is especially
relevant in sentencing cases. The CCA has declared that it will
intervene only where the appellant has shown that there was an error
of principle, but many of the Court’s observations in sentencing cases
must be interpreted in the context of the particular circumstances
that are presented to it. 
Second, by and large, the CCA tends to support trial judges
as far as the management of trials is concerned. Where a ground of
appeal rested on a matter that fell within the discretion of the trial
judge, the Court, more likely than not, upheld the course of action
adopted by the trial judge. There is no explicit pronouncement to
this effect, but an implicit acknowledgment that the trial judge is best
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4 People (DPP) v Foley 26 May 2003 (ex temp).
5 People (DPP) v WN 20 November 2003, discussed in text at note 176.
placed to make the array of decisions relating to the conduct of the
trial is discernible.
Third, it is evident that the Court is reluctant to admit
grounds of appeal based on points not raised at the trial. There are
exceptions, but it seems that a general principle, that a point must be
raised at the appropriate time in the trial, has found favour with the
CCA.
With these remarks in mind, this paper turns to consider the
principal developments in detail.
II. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Intoxication
The effect of intoxication on criminal liability is well
established in the neighbouring jurisdiction. In DPP v Majewski,6 the
House of Lords held that evidence of intoxication could negate
specific intent but that it would not absolve an accused of liability
for a crime of basic intent. While that decision has been much
criticised and has been departed from in several jurisdictions, the
CCA confirmed that it represents Irish law and that a change could
only be effected by legislation. In People (DPP) v Reilly,7 the
applicant, who was convicted of manslaughter, had argued that he
was in a state of automatism at the time of the killing. Relying on
Majewski, the trial judge ruled that automatism brought about by
the voluntary consumption of alcohol did not afford a defence and
that while murder required proof of specific intent, the offence of
manslaughter did not. This ruling was approved by the CCA:
If a person by consuming alcohol induces in himself
a situation in which his likelihood to commit acts of
violence is increased, particularly to the stage where
he commits an act which he would not have
committed had he not consumed alcohol, then surely
the courts would be failing in their obligation to the
public if they allowed the cause of his violence,
namely the alcohol, to excuse his actions. The
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6 [1977] A.C. 443.
7 [2004] I.E.C.C.A 9
reasoning behind the Majewski decision appears to
this Court to achieve the balance between the rights
of the accused, who is entitled to be acquitted if the
jury found automatism which was, in the words of
the trial judge ‘free standing’, as against the rights of
the public to ensure that the applicant will be held
liable for actions which were induced by alcohol
voluntarily consumed.
The Court later granted a section 29 certificate, noting that
the defence advanced in Reilly was rarely raised in Ireland and that
the authorities in other common law countries reflected different
approaches.8
B. Common Design/Joint Enterprise
An accused will frequently contend that the act done or the
means employed went beyond the scope of the common design to
which he or she was party. In People (DPP) v Kenny,9 the Court was
satisfied with a charge that made it plain to the jury that a party to
the common design must have knowledge of what is to occur. In
People (DPP) v Roche,10 the applicant was a member of a group that
attacked the deceased who died from a blow struck by a ratchet used
by one of the group. It was argued by the applicant that the use of
the ratchet went beyond the common design and that the jury should
have been invited to consider this matter. In upholding the
conviction, the CCA approved the charge to the jury that did not
take account of this suggestion: the common enterprise was the
commission of serious assaults against the deceased and it did not
matter that a ratchet rather than some other instrument was used.
In People (DPP) v Doohan,11 it was argued that the assailant
went beyond the joint enterprise agreed with the appellant. The
appellant procured a punishment style beating of the deceased and
left the arrangements to his co-accused, but he asked that injury to
the victim’s head be avoided. The attack in fact involved the use of a
shotgun which resulted in the killing. The CCA was satisfied that
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8 [2004] I.E.C.C.A 9, People (DPP) v Reilly 21 May 2004.  
9 [2003] 4 I.R. 162.
10 [2004] I.E.C.C.A 24.  
11 2 December 2002.
there was sufficient evidence to find that the appellant had entered
into a joint enterprise to cause serious harm to the deceased and that
was sufficient mens rea for murder. The fact that the appellant had
not expressly agreed to the discharge of the shotgun did not prevent
the trial court from concluding that its use was within the scope of
the common design.
The decision in People (DPP) v Rose12 is an example of a case
where a killing is held to fall outside the common design. The
appellant’s conviction of assault with intent to rob was upheld, but
her conviction for the subsequent murder of the victim was quashed.
Reviewing the evidence, the CCA concluded that a direction should
have been granted by the trial judge. The Court drew the distinction
between being a participant and being a spectator: “If she was not a
participator in the crime as part of a joint enterprise but was a mere
spectator she had no criminal liability even if she did not express any
words or take any steps to prevent what was happening.”
C. Burden Of Proof and Defences
The proposition established in People (DPP) v Davis,13 that
the accused bears an evidential burden in relation to provocation,
has been extended to cases of self-defence.14 In reaching this
conclusion in O’Carroll v DPP,15 the CCA noted that the evidential
burden is not heavy. The burden involves the accused’s being able to
point to some evidence that suggests the presence of the elements of
the defence. The trial judge must be satisfied that “an issue of
substance, as distinct from a contrived issue or a vague possibility”
has been raised.
On the other hand, in People (DPP) v John James Kelly,16 the
Court emphasised that the evidential burden was low: “[t]he
threshold for allowing provocation to go to the jury is a low one and
has been held to be so in quite a number of earlier cases.” The Court
found that, while the evidence supporting provocation was not of “a
particularly strong variety,” it was sufficient to allow the issue go to
the jury.
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12 12 February 2002.
13 [2001] 1 I.R. 146.
14 See also People (DPP) v Dickey 7 March 2003 where the Court applied the same principle
to the defence of duress.
15 [2004] I.E.C.C.A 16, 6 July 2004.  
16 6 February 2004. See also People (DPP) v Ceka [2004] I.E.C.C.A 25, discussed in text at
notes 20 and 24-25. 
D. Self-Defence
The law governing self-defence is now contained exclusively
in section 18 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act,
1997.17 The CCA has been presented with several opportunities to
consider the application of that provision. 
In People (DPP) v Patrick (Rubber Og) O’Reilly,18 the issue
of self-defence arose in relation to charges of possession of a firearm
for an unlawful purpose and violent disorder. The Court clarified
that the test is subjective. The issue was whether the applicant
honestly held the belief mentioned in section 18. The jury was to
assess this matter having regard to the existence of reasonable
grounds for the belief, but the latter point was not the deciding
factor and this should have been made clear to the jury by the trial
judge. In People (DPP) v McCormack and others,19 the CCA held
that it was a wrong to exclude the defence in section 18 from a
charge of violent disorder. The Court noted that there was little
statutory guidance on the matter, but concluded that section 18
provided additional protection to an accused charged with violent
disorder.
In People (DPP) v Ceka,20 the deceased attacked the
applicant, who had been forewarned of this possibility and had
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17 Section 18 (1) states: 
“The use of force by a person for any of the following purposes, if only such as is reasonable
in the circumstances as he or she believes them to be, does not constitute an offence—
( a ) to protect himself or herself or a member of the family of that person or another from
injury, assault or detention caused by a criminal act; or
( b ) to protect himself or herself or (with the authority of that other) another from trespass to
the person; or
( c ) to protect his or her property from appropriation, destruction or damage caused by a
criminal act or from trespass or infringement; or
( d ) to protect property belonging to another from appropriation, destruction or damage
caused by a criminal act or (with the authority of that other) from trespass or infringement; or
( e ) to prevent crime or a breach of the peace.”
Section 18(5) and (6) elaborate on the nature of the belief specified in subsection (1):
“(5) For the purposes of this section the question whether the act against which force is used
is of a kind mentioned in any of the paragraphs (a) to (e) of subsection (1) shall be determined
according to the circumstances as the person using the force believes them to be.
(6) Notwithstanding subsection (1), a person who believes circumstances to exist which would
justify or excuse the use of force under that subsection has no defence if he or she knows that
the force is used against a member of the Garda Síochána acting in the course of the member's
duty or a person so assisting such member, unless he or she believes the force to be immediately
necessary to prevent harm to himself or herself or another.”
18 [2004] I.E.C.C.A 27.
19 20 April 2004.
20 [2004] I.E.C.C.A 25.  
taken the “precaution” of carrying a concealed knife. Having
overcome the attack and knocked the deceased to the ground, the
applicant stabbed him several times. The CCA held that it was for
the jury to decide whether the applicant’s actions were capable of
being committed in self-defence and, on the facts, it concluded that
it was open to the jury to conclude that the applicant had not acted
in self-defence.
The CCA has also reconsidered the question of the liability
of an accused who kills while using excessive force in self-defence,
but where the degree of force employed was no more than he or she
believed to be reasonably necessary. Many years before the
enactment of the 1997 legislation, the Supreme Court held, in People
(AG) v Dwyer,21 that an accused in those circumstances would be
guilty of manslaughter, not murder. However, the language of section
18 potentially casts doubt on that ruling and, on a literal
interpretation, it invites the conclusion that an accused in a similar
case would now be entitled to a full acquittal. This is a matter on
which the commentators have expressed different views.22 The CCA’s
decision in O’Carroll v DPP23 seems to have resolved the issue when
it held that the jury in such a case should be directed along the lines
of the Dwyer decision:
The jury should have been told to approach the case
in the manner authoritatively required by the
decision of this Court in Dwyer. In other words they
should have been told to consider, not only whether
there was evidence that a situation of self defence had
arisen, but whether the defendant had or had not
employed more force in self defence than was
reasonably necessary, and whether he had used more
force than was reasonably necessary, but no more
than he honestly believed to be necessary. In the latter
event, they should have been told that the
appropriate verdict was manslaughter.
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22 See Charleton, McDermott and Bolger Criminal Law (Dublin, Butterworths, 1999), pp
1035-1045; Hanly, An Introduction to Irish Criminal Law (Dublin, Gill & Macmillan, 1999)
p 101; McAuley and McCutcheon, Criminal Liability (Dublin, Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell,
2000) pp 744-746, 764 et seq.
23 [2004] I.E.C.C.A 16
The Court went on to hold that a direction that left the jury
with only the options of acquitting or convicting of murder, without
an option to convict of manslaughter, was erroneous. However, the
Court did not refer to section 18 of the 1997 Act and it remains to
be decided whether that provision applies to fatal force, as a literal
reading suggests, or whether it is confined to cases of non-fatal
violence. The invocation of the decision in Dwyer might invite the
conclusion that the latter is the case but, given that the point was not
raised, it could not be taken to have been decided.
E. Provocation
Provocation was raised as an alternative defence to self-
defence in People (DPP) v Ceka, the facts of which have been
outlined above.24 The CCA held that a direction which expressly
reversed the onus of proof in respect of provocation was erroneous.
However, the Court applied the proviso in section 3 of the Criminal
Procedure Act, 1993,25 being satisfied that the misdirection did not
result in a miscarriage of justice. On the evidence, it was satisfied
that there was no sufficient case of provocation to justify a finding
of manslaughter and the jury’s rejection of the alternative defence of
self-defence implicitly amounted to a finding that the applicant knew
he was using excessive force. Nevertheless, the Court was at pains to
reiterate the burden of proof in provocation cases:
From three authoritative decisions, therefore, it
emerges indisputably that, while the defence has to
satisfy a test of the existence of a body of apparently
credible evidence to justify the leaving the matter to
the jury, nonetheless, once the issue is left to them by
the trial judge, the issue is subject to the orthodox rule
regarding the burden of proof. The legal burden
remains with the prosecution. 
In People (DPP) v Doyle,26 the CCA found that the trial
judge was correct in refusing to allow the issue of provocation go to
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24 See text at note 20. See also People (DPP) v Maher 17 May 2004 (ex temp).
25 Section 3(1)(a) stipulates that the Court may “affirm the conviction (and may do so,
notwithstanding that it is of opinion that a point raised in the appeal might be decided in
favour of the appellant, if it considers that no miscarriage of justice has actually occurred).”
26 22 March 2002.
the jury. The applicant’s conduct indicated that there was no sudden
or temporary loss of self-control: he embarked on a journey with
four others, anticipating a violent confrontation at their
destination.27
F. Endangerment
The offence of endangerment is contained in section 13 of
the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act, 1997.28 In People
(DPP) v McGrath,29 the applicant, who was being restrained at the
time, exhorted a co-accused to strike the deceased. The latter struck
the deceased twice, causing him to fall onto the road where he hit his
head again. The deceased died from his head injuries. The CCA
adopted the ordinary meaning of the words in section 13 and held
that the offence may exist even if no injury occurs: the offence is a
general one of endangerment. The Court approved a charge that the
jury had to be satisfied that there was intentional or reckless
conduct, creating a substantial risk of death or serious harm to
another. It also held that the fact that the accused was acquitted of
manslaughter was not inconsistent with finding him guilty of
endangerment.  In the companion case, People (DPP) v Cagney,30
where the applicant was the actual assailant, the CCA held that, on
the evidence, all the elements of the offence were present and it was
a matter for the jury to determine whether the prosecution had
established its case. The Court later granted section 29 certificates
referring the matter to the Supreme Court.31
G. Harassment
In People (DPP) v Sloane,32 the Court upheld a conviction for
harassment, contrary to section 10 of the Non-Fatal Offences
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27 See also People (DPP) v McDonnell 22 April 2002 (ex temp): CCA held that the issue of
provocation should not have gone to the jury but that the trial judge’s charge was impeccable. 
28 Section 13 defines the offence of harassment: “(1) A person shall be guilty of an offence who
intentionally or recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of death or
serious harm to another.”
29 [2004] I.E.C.C.A 11.
30 [2004] I.E.C.C.A 10.
31 People (DPP) v Cagney [2004] I.E.C.C.A 21: “Is the offence of endangerment contrary to s
13 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act, 1997 capable of being construed so as
to cover circumstances such as in the instant case?” The same question was certified in People
(DPP) v McGrath [2004] I.E.C.C.A 20.
32 21 January 2002 (ex temp).
Against the Person Act, 1997.33 The complainant was a student who
edited a student magazine while the appellant was not a student, but
frequented the college campus. The CCA rejected the contention that
given that the communications were with a magazine editor, they
were not “without lawful authority” since the communications in
question contained offensive material. The Court also held that the
fact that the magazine itself allegedly contained offensive material
was irrelevant.34
H. Affray
The offence of affray, which is now governed by section 16
of the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act, 1994,35 was considered in
People (DPP) v Reid; People (DPP) v Kirwan.36 The Court noted
that affray differs from the offences of riot and unlawful violence, in
sections 14 and 15 of 1994 Act respectively, in that it requires that
the participants in an affray must demonstrate violence “towards
each other.” Thus, where there was no evidence that the applicant
had used, or threatened to use, violence against another member of
the group allegedly involved in the affray, there is no prima facie case
and the trial judge should have acceded to a defence request for a
direction. 
The Court found it unnecessary in People (DPP) v Reid;
People (DPP) v Kirwan to rule on another point raised in the appeal,
namely whether section 16 is broad enough to capture the case of a
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33 Harassment is defined in section 10: “(1) Any person who, without lawful authority or
reasonable excuse, by any means including by use of the telephone, harasses another by
persistently following, watching, pestering, besetting or communicating with him or her, shall
be guilty of an offence.
(2) For the purposes of this section a person harasses another where-
( a ) he or she, by his or her acts intentionally or recklessly, seriously interferes with 
the other's peace and privacy or causes alarm, distress or harm to the other, and
( b ) his or her acts are such that a reasonable person would realise that the acts would
seriously interfere with the other's peace and privacy or cause alarm, distress or harm
to the other. 
34 The Court suspended the balance of the applicant’s three-year sentence on condition that he
did not communicate with the complainant or approach within one kilometre of her residence
or place of work.
35 The ingredients of the offence are specified in section 16(1): “Where ( a ) two or more
persons at any place (whether that place is a public place or a private place or both) use or
threaten to use violence towards each other, and ( b ) the violence so used or threatened by one
of those persons is unlawful, and ( c ) the conduct of those persons taken together is such as
would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at that place to fear for his or another
person’s safety, then, each such person who uses or threatens to use unlawful violence shall be
guilty of the offence of affray.”
36 [2004] 1 I.R. 392.
person who uses lawful violence against another who is engaged in
unlawful violence if the conduct of both is such as to put “a person
of reasonable firmness in fear of his or another person’s safety.”
Were this the case, the Court pointed out, it would “clearly raise
questions of a far reaching nature.” Conceivably, a person using
lawful force in self-defence or a Garda using reasonable force to
effect a lawful arrest could be convicted of affray if the other
elements of the offence were present. Resolution of this issue awaits
the appropriate case.
I. Offences Against the State
In People (DPP) v Campbell,37 the CCA held that the Real
IRA was an illegal organisation for the purposes of section 18 of the
Offences Against the State Act, 1939. The Court took the view that
a suppression order issued in respect of the IRA applied to the Real
IRA, but it went on to observe that the latter group would in any
event be an illegal organisation in the absence of a suppression.38
J. Section 31 of the Criminal Justice 1994
In People (DPP) v Meehan,39 the Court held that section 3140
created two offences and, accordingly, a count, charging the
appellant with laundering the proceeds of tobacco smuggling and
drug trafficking, was bad for duplicity.41
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37 19 December 2003.
38 The appeal was successful on the different ground that it was prejudicial to the accused to
allow cross-examination in relation to a named individual who had previously been before the
Special Criminal Court. The CCA also granted a section 29 certificate on the question whether
the suppression order applies to the Real IRA. See further text at notes 219-220.
39 27 June 2002.
40 Section 31 stipulates: 
“(1) A person shall be guilty of an offence if he—
( a ) conceals or disguises any property which is, or in whole or in part directly or indirectly
represents, his proceeds of drug trafficking or other criminal activity, or
( b ) converts or transfers that property or removes it from the State,
for the purpose of avoiding prosecution for an offence or the making or enforcement in his
case of a confiscation order.
(2) A person shall be guilty of an offence if, knowing or believing that any property is, or in
whole or in part directly or indirectly represents, another person's proceeds of drug trafficking
or other criminal activity, he—
( a ) conceals or disguises that property, or
( b ) converts or transfers that property or removes it from the State,
for the purpose of assisting any person to avoid prosecution for an offence or the making or
enforcement of a confiscation order.
(3) A person shall be guilty of an offence if he handles any property knowing or believing that
such property is, or in whole or in part directly or indirectly represents, another person's
proceeds of drug trafficking or other criminal activity.”
41 Discussed further in text at note 96.
The ingredients of the offence contained in section 31,
namely handling property that represented the proceeds of drug
trafficking, were considered in People (DPP) v McHugh.42 Money
found in the accused’s possession contained microscopic traces of
diamorphine and the accused made a statement to the effect that he
believed the money to be derived from drug trafficking. The CCA
ruled that the prosecution must prove the criminal provenance of the
property in question and that this was not established either by the
evidence of drug traces on the banknotes or the accused’s admission
of his belief of the origin of the money. The latter would, of course,
be evidence that the accused had the relevant mens rea for the
offence: the difficulty was that there was no evidence of a vital
element of the actus reus, namely the fact that the money was the
proceeds of drug trafficking. In effect, the Court acted on the




While evidence of informal identification might be
admissible at the discretion of the trial judge, the dangers inherent in
such evidence were outlined in People (DPP) v Lee.44 The CCA
observed that, in such cases, the process of formal identification
should be explained to the jury so that they can contrast it with the
informal identification that occurred. The jury should also be
reminded of the reasons given by the prosecution for not holding a
formal identification parade and of the defence case for challenging
the identification evidence presented. Moreover, the Court also
stated that trial judge’s charge should specify the dangers of relying
on informal identification. 
The conduct of a formal identification parade was raised in
People (DPP) v Brazil.45 The Court held that the fairness of the
identification parade was not affected by the presence of one of the
investigating Gardai in the room when the witness made her
identification nor by the failure to keep a record of the volunteers’
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42 12 February 2002.
43 See McAuley and McCutcheon, Criminal Liability (Dublin, Round Hall/Sweet & Maxwell,
2000) pp. 117-118.
44 [2004] I.E.C.C.A 18.
45 22 March 2002.
descriptions. However, the Court warned against the practice of
showing the witness a Garda photograph of the accused after the
witness had selected him.
B. DNA Evidence
The problems associated with DNA evidence were
highlighted in People (DPP) v Allen.46 The Court alluded to the
danger that, given its technical nature, a jury might jump to the
conclusion that DNA evidence is infallible. In this case, an expert
witness testified that the possibility of matching profiles was one in
1,000,000,000, but that a match was “more likely” in the case of
siblings. The CCA considered that the lack of actual statistics
concerning brothers had the potential to mislead the jury into
believing that the increased possibility in the case of brothers was so
remote that they could disregard it. In the circumstances, the Court
was satisfied that the manner in which the evidence was left rendered
the trial unsafe and a retrial was ordered.
C. Accomplice Evidence and Witness Protection Programmes
In People (DPP) v Gilligan,47 evidence against the applicant
was given by accomplices who benefited from the newly established
witness protection programme. The CCA observed that the witness
protection programme “was badly thought out and [had] almost
developed a life of its own.” The Court amplified its concerns:
This was the first time that a witness protection programme
had been implemented in this State, and one of the most
worrying features is that there never seems to have actually
been a programme. There ought to have been clear guidelines
from the beginning as to what could or could not be offered to
the witnesses. This was not done, and instead there was an
ongoing series of demands by the witnesses, most of which, it
must be said, were rejected, but the position was kept fluid
almost right up to the time when they gave evidence.
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47 8 August 2003. 
Nevertheless, the Court accepted that, in general, the Gardai
and prosecuting authorities were entitled to offer protection to
witnesses and their families and that the evidence of such witnesses
was not unlawfully obtained for that reason alone. The real issue
concerned the benefits that could be offered under the guise of
protecting witnesses. Thus, the Court opined that evidence tendered
on foot of an agreement to pay the witness to testify in a particular
way would be unlawful and could be excluded. In the instant case,
the Court was satisfied that no such course of action had occurred. 
The Court distinguished Northern Irish authorities which
held that the evidence of a “supergrass” is to be treated differently
from that of ordinary accomplices.48 Instead, the CCA set out the
relevant considerations to be taken into account by trial courts: (i)
was it recognised by the court of trial that there were dangers in
accepting the evidence without corroboration? (ii) were those
dangers identified by that court? (iii) in the light of the particular
facts relating to the evidence of each accomplice, were those dangers
safeguarded against? (vi) with regard to the particular circumstances
of each accomplice, were the measures taken and identified to
safeguard against the dangers properly applied? (v) if all these
matters were properly addressed, could the evidence of the
accomplice be reasonably accepted?
The CCA was satisfied that the trial court had been aware of
the dangers involved. Noting that corroboration of the accomplice
evidence was not mandatory, the Court observed that the trial court
had nonetheless sought corroboration in the form of circumstantial
evidence or independent testimony. The CCA concluded that the
trial court was entitled to find beyond reasonable doubt on the
evidence before it that the accused was guilty of the offences with
which he was charged.
There was a different outcome in People (DPP) v Ward,49
where the court overturned the applicant’s conviction for murder
based on similar accomplice evidence. The Court acknowledged that
the trier of fact should be warned of the danger of convicting on the
basis of uncorroborated accomplice evidence, but stated that the
general lack of credibility of the accomplice meant that his testimony
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48 R v Crumley [1986] N.I. 66; R v Steenson [1986] 17 N.I.J.B. 36.
49 20 March 2002.
must be treated with the “utmost care.”50
D. Corroboration
A failure to comply with section 10 of the Criminal
Procedure Act, 1993,51 which requires a warning on the absence of
corroboration of confession evidence, was fatal in People (DPP) v
Lindsey.52 Observing that section 10 establishes a mandatory
requirement, the CCA held that no particular form of words is
required, but that the jury should have their attention drawn to the
absence of corroboration, should have its meaning explained to
them and they should be instructed to have due regard to its absence.
In People (DPP) v Connolly,53 the Court observed that
section 10 left a wide margin of discretion to trial judges as to how
a jury should be warned. However, it emphasised the importance of
making the phrase “due regard to the absence of corroboration”
intelligible to the jury by explaining the meaning of corroboration
and the factual nature of the prosecution case. In the instant case, the
judge had only given a brief one-sentence indication of the meaning
of corroboration, which the CCA considered to be inadequate. The
Court observed that it would not be unduly burdensome to explain
the meaning of corroboration and that it would be useful briefly to
explain to the jury the reason why corroboration of confession
evidence might be considered desirable. Acknowledging that the
precise charge to the jury will depend on the circumstances of the
case, the Court nevertheless indicated that something along the lines
of the model charge suggested by the Martin Committee might be
appropriate.54
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50 See Heffernan, “The Vagaries of Accomplice Evidence” (2003) 38 Ir Jur  369, discussing the
Ward decision.
51 Section 10 states:
“(1) Where at a trial of a person on indictment evidence is given of a confession made by that
person and that evidence is not corroborated, the judge shall advise the jury to have due regard
to the absence of corroboration.
(2) It shall not be necessary for a judge to use any particular form of words under this section.”
52 [2004] I.E.C.C.A 6.
53 [2003] 2 I.R. 1.
54 “If your verdict as to the guilt of the accused is to depend wholly or substantially on the
accused’s inculpatory admission, you should bear in mind that there have been a number of
instances in the past where admissions have subsequently been proved to be unreliable;
accordingly you should be specially cautious in considering a degree of weight to be attached
to the admission, but if after careful consideration of all the circumstances you feel satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt that it is safe to rely upon it, then you are at liberty to do so.
However in so considering this issue you should have regard to the nature and duration of the
custody, and such effect, if any, as you are satisfied it had on the mind of the accused, taking
into consideration all such matters as appear to you to be relevant, including age, sex, degree
of intelligence and educational attainments.” Report of the Committee to Enquire into Certain
Aspects of Criminal Procedure (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1990) p 39.
In contrast, a consequence of the abolition, by section 7 of
the Criminal Law (Rape)(Amendment) Act, 1990,55 of a mandatory
warning on corroboration in sexual offence cases, is that the
question of whether such a warning should be given lies within the
discretion of the trial judge.56 However, in People (DPP) v PJ,57 it was
held that if the trial judge chooses to give a corroboration warning,
he or she must do so in clear and unmistakable terms. In that case,
the warning was considered defective where the judge had failed to
explain the meaning of corroboration and how a lack of
corroboration might affect the jury’s view of the evidence. In People
(DPP) v Gentleman,58 where the trial judge, in a prosecution for a
number of counts of indecent assault, chose to give a corroboration
warning, it was held that the jury should be informed why the law
considers it unsafe to convict on uncorroborated evidence and that
they need to exercise caution and special care. 
The question of a trial judge identifying the particular items
of evidence that could be taken to provide corroboration was
discussed in two cases. In People (DPP) v Slavotic,59 the Court
quashed a conviction for rape under section 4 of the Criminal Law
(Rape)(Amendment) Act, 1990 on the basis that it was incorrect to
direct the jury that a particular item of evidence could be treated as
corroboration when that evidence was equally open to an innocent
explanation. In People (DPP) v PC,60 the trial judge’s otherwise
“impeccable” charge was found erroneous, where he went beyond
merely reciting the prosecution argument that an aspect of the
complainant’s evidence lent credibility to her testimony and directed
them that it was capable of amounting to corroboration.
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55 That provision states:
“(1) Subject to any enactment relating to the corroboration of evidence in criminal
proceedings, where at the trial on indictment of a person charged with an offence of a sexual
nature evidence is given by the person in relation to whom the offence is alleged to have been
committed and, by reason only of the nature of the charge, there would, but for this section,
be a requirement that the jury be given a warning about the danger of convicting the person
on the uncorroborated evidence of that other person, it shall be for the judge to decide in his
discretion, having regard to all the evidence given, whether the jury should be given the
warning; and accordingly any rule of law or practice by virtue of which there is such a
requirement as aforesaid is hereby abolished.
(2) If a judge decides, in his discretion, to give such a warning as aforesaid, it shall not be
necessary to use any particular form of words to do so.”
56 People (DPP) v D O’S [2004] I.E.C.C.A 12. See also People (DPP) v Ferris 10 June 2002
(however, it was stated to be wrong for prosecution counsel to have told the jury that the trial
judge chose not to give a warning on corroboration.)
57 [2003] 3 I.R. 550.
58 25 February 2002.
59 18 November 2002.
60 [2002] 2 I.R. 285.
E. Evidence of Bad Character
The admissibility of evidence of bad character was
considered in several cases, the most significant of which is People
(DPP) v Ferris.61 The appellant, who was charged with 32 counts of
indecent assault, called two aunts to testify, who gave evidence
which the prosecution successfully contended amounted to evidence
of his good character. Accordingly, the prosecution was permitted by
the trial judge to recall the appellant and cross-examine him as to
pornographic material of a paedophile nature that was found in his
apartment. The CCA observed that, in seeking to cross-examine the
accused as to his character, the prosecution had relied exclusively on
section 1(f) of the Criminal Justice (Evidence) Act, 1924.62 Turning
to the statutory provision, the Court concluded that section 1(f) did
not apply in the instant case. That provision applies where an
accused gives evidence of his good character or where he, or his
advocate, cross-examines prosecution witnesses with a view to
establishing his good character. The sub-section does not govern the
circumstances where witnesses called by the defence tender evidence
of good character.
The situation said to be relevant to the present case is
that which occurs when the accused ‘has given
evidence of his good character.’ But, assuming the
evidence of the aunts to speak to the character of the
accused, it was not the accused who gave it. It is true
that the situation envisaged earlier in the sub-
paragraph engages the responsibility of the
‘advocate’ of the accused in the event that he seeks to
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61 10 June 2002. Other cases were People (DPP) v Kelly 21 March 2002 (ex temp): cross-
examination of appellant as to origin of cash found in his possession and how he made his
living held to transgress Criminal Justice (Evidence) Act, 1924, section 1(f); People (DPP) v
McGartland 20 January 2003 (ex temp): jury should have been discharged when Garda
witness testified that appellant was known to Gardai for some time.
62 Section 1(f) provides: “a person charged and called as a witness in pursuance of this Act shall
not be asked, and if asked shall not be required to answer, any question tending to show that
he has committed or been convicted of or been charged with any offence other than that
wherewith he is then charged, or is of bad character, unless—
(i) the proof that he has committed or been convicted of such other offence is admissible
evidence to show that he is guilty of the offence wherewith he is then charged; or
(ii) he has personally or by his advocate asked questions of the witnesses for the prosecution
with a view to establish his own good character, or has given evidence of his good character,
or the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations on the character of
the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution; or
(iii) he has given evidence against any other person charged with the same offence:”
establish his good character through cross-
examination of the prosecution witnesses. However,
there is no provision for the case where the defence
calls character witnesses other than the accused. 
In the CCA’s view, the common law provided the only basis
on which the cross-examination could have been allowed. However,
as noted above, the prosecution relied exclusively on the statutory
provision and it followed that no question of the admissibility of that
evidence at common law arose. In any event, the Court expressed the
opinion, albeit obiter, that the evidence would not have been
admissible at common law as it amounted to evidence of disposition
rather than evidence of bad character.63
F. System Evidence and Similar Fact Evidence
The CCA has drawn a distinction between similar fact
evidence, which is inadmissible, and system evidence, which is
admissible. The latter is described as “evidence of a system of
conduct bearing striking resemblance to the acts complained of by
the victim.” It is a matter for the trial judge to decide, in the exercise
of his or her discretion, which side of the line the evidence in a
particular case falls. Moreover, a court is not precluded from
admitting system evidence from witnesses who were complainants in
earlier proceedings in which the accused was acquitted.64
G. Prior Inconsistent statements
In People (DPP) v McArdle,65 the Court confirmed the rule
that a prior inconsistent statement goes only to the credibility of the
witness and rejected the argument that it could be evidence of the
truth.
H. Recent Complaint
It is well established that evidence that the complainant made
a complaint to a third party in the absence of the accused as soon as
reasonably possible after the event may be admitted in trials for
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63 R v Rowton (1865) 10 Cox CC 25 applied.  
64 People (DPP) v D O’S [2004] I.E.C.C.A 23
65 [2003] 4 I.R. 186.
sexual offences.66 This evidence, which is allowed as an exception to
the hearsay rule, is admitted to establish consistency on the part of
the complainant. In People (DPP) v A,67 the CCA held that it was a
misdirection not to explain the reason why evidence of recent
complaint is received and to emphasise that it is not evidence of the
facts on which the complaint is based. This was laid down as a
mandatory requirement and is not a matter of discretion for the trial
judge. The Court also held that the jury should be instructed that
evidence of recent complaint is not corroboration in the legal sense
of that term.
I. Rebuttal Evidence
In People (DPP) v Nevin,68 the applicant adduced evidence
that her husband, whose murder she had been charged with, was a
member of the IRA. The CCA held that the admission of evidence to
rebut that assertion was correct. The evidence adduced by the
applicant was hearsay but the rebuttal evidence was not. The latter
indicated that neither family members nor the Gardai considered the
deceased to have been involved with the IRA.
J. Offences Against the State
In People (DPP) v Gannon,69 the Court considered the
position where a Chief Superintendent gives evidence of his or her
belief that the accused was a member of an illegal organisation. The
Court observed that a failure by the accused to give evidence does
not add cogency to the Chief Superintendent’s evidence. However,
the Special Criminal Court was held entitled to conclude that the
unchallenged evidence of the prosecution established the case
beyond reasonable doubt. In People (DPP) v Mulligan,70 the CCA
pointed to the significant changes to the law of evidence brought
about by the Offences against the State legislation. Nevertheless, the
Court concluded that, in the absence of a constitutional challenge, it
was obliged to apply that legislation. Consequently, it held that the
Special Criminal Court was entitled to draw inference from the
applicant’s failure to answer questions.
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66 See e.g. People (DPP) v Brophy [1992] I.L.R.M. 709.
67 [2002] 2 I.R. 601.
68 [2003] 3 I.R. 321.
69 2 April 2003.
70 17 May 2004.
IV. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Arrest, detention and questioning
A person arrested under section 30 of the Offences against
the State Act, 1939 must be held in “a garda station, a prison or
some other convenient place.” The lawfulness of taking an accused
from the station on a car journey was at issue in People (DPP) v
McGrath.71 The applicant went voluntarily in the vehicle to show
Gardai the location of the gun used in the murder that was under
investigation. The CCA held that a temporary absence of the
applicant from the Garda station did not render the detention
unlawful because it was a continuation of the same detention, rather
than a removal of the accused to another place.72 The extension of
detention by a Chief Superintendent who was supplied false
information by the investigating officer was considered in People
(DPP) v Mulligan.73 In the circumstance, the Chief Superintendent
had acted on his independent, bona fide belief that the circumstances
warranted extension and, accordingly, the Court held that the
extended detention was lawful.
In People (DPP) v O’Brien,74 statements made by the
applicant whilst in custody but before he had been granted access to
a solicitor were excluded from evidence on the ground that they had
been obtained in a conscious and deliberate violation of his
constitutional rights. However, further statements that he made after
he had been facilitated with a visit from his solicitor were admitted
into evidence. The CCA upheld this ruling, taking the view that the
defect in the applicant’s detention had been cured once access to a
solicitor was provided. 
In People (DPP) v McCowan,75 the appellant made a number
of denials during his questioning by the Gardai. The CCA
condemned the failure to take sufficient notes as a “serious matter.”
The Court took the view that if the Gardai felt it was of sufficient
importance to ask a question, then the answer should be recorded.
Where the same question is asked a number of times, each reply
should be recorded so that the true flavour of the interview is
presented. 
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71 2 December 2002.
72 The People (DPP) v Farrell [1978] I.R. 13 and The State (Walsh) v Maguire [1979] I.R. 372
applied.
73 17 May 2004.
74 17 June 2002.
75 [2003] 4 I.R. 349.
In People (DPP) v Connolly,76 the Court commented on the
failure to record interviews of suspects. The Court noted that
legislative provision for such recording exists77 and that police
interviews are recorded as a matter of routine in most “first world
common law”78 countries, but that it is a rarity in Ireland. The Court
hinted that the current state of affairs may have tested the limits of
judicial tolerance: “[t]he time cannot be remote that we will hear a
submission that, absent extraordinary circumstances (by which we
do not mean that a particular Garda station has no audio visual
machinery or that the audio visual room was being painted) it is
unacceptable to tender in evidence a statement which has not been
so recorded.”79
In People (DPP) v Diver,80 the Court expressed its concern at
breaches of custody regulations, although it upheld the trial judge’s
decision to admit the evidence that had been thereby obtained.81 In
People (DPP) v McGrath,82 the Court again advanced the view that
a breach of custody regulations did not affect the lawfulness of
custody or the admissibility of evidence.83 On the other hand, a
breach of regulations had drastically different consequences in
People (DPP) v McFadden.84 There, a search that was conducted
without informing the appellant of the basis on which it was being
done was held to be more than a “trivial or inconsequential” matter
and the evidence thereby obtained was excluded. 
B. Search
In People (DPP) v McFadden, the CCA considered the
lawfulness of a search conducted on an arrested person. The Court
approved as correct Professor Walsh’s statement of the law:85
At common law a member of the Garda Siochana has
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76 [2003] 2 I.R. 1.
77 Criminal Justice Act, 1984, section 27; Criminal Justice Act, 1984 (Electronic Recording of
Interviews) Regulations 1997
78 [2003] 2 I.R. 1 at 18.
79 [2003] 2 I.R. 1 at 18; see People (DPP) v Freeman 12 November 2003 (ex temp) holding
that there was no prejudice to the accused where the video of the applicant’s questioning did
not contain any sound.
80 10 April 2002.  
81 An application for a section 29 certificate was successful: see text at note 222.
82 2 December 2002.
83 See also People (DPP) v Hogan 12 July 2004: CCA upheld exercise of trial judge’s discretion
to admit evidence obtained in breach of custody regulations and Judges’ Rules.
84 [2003] 2 I.R. 105.
85 Criminal Procedure (Dublin, Thomson Round Hall, 2002) p. 196.
the power to search a person whom he or she has
arrested. The purpose of this search would appear to
be to enable the member to take into possession
anything found on the person in the nature of a
dangerous weapon or which may be used to facilitate
an escape from custody, or any item which may be of
evidentiary value. In most cases, therefore, the search
will be confined to a body frisk and examination of
the suspect’s outer garments.
The Court went on to hold that a search is subject to an
important precondition: the person being searched must be informed
of the nature of the search and the statutory (or common law) power
that is being invoked.86 A failure to so inform was more than a trivial
breach of custody regulations. It violated a “fundamental
requirement” of informing the person being searched of the legal
justification for interfering with his constitutional rights.
Drugs were seized in a warrantless search of the applicant’s
parents’ house in People (DPP) v Bowes.87 The applicant did not
reside at that address, but stayed there occasionally. The CCA
upheld the trial judge’s ruling that there was no breach of the
applicant’s right to inviolability of the dwelling under Article 40.5 of
the Constitution: there was ample evidence on which to assess
whether or not it was his legal dwelling.
The Court has observed that a Garda Superintendent’s power
to issue a search warrant under section 8 of the Criminal Justice
(Drug Trafficking) Act, 1996 should be considered an exception to
the general powers of a District Judge or Peace Commissioner to
issue warrants. As such, it is an emergency provision to be used in
limited circumstances and the Gardai are not entitled to decide when
they will apply to a District Judge or Peace Commissioner for a
warrant.88
The basis on which a search warrant issued by a District
Judge could be challenged was considered in People (DPP) v
Tallant.89 A District Judge issues two warrants based on
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87 25 February 2002.
88 People (DPP) v Byrne [2003] 4 I.R. 423, but the conviction was upheld applying section
3(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1993.
89 [2003] 4 I.R. 343.
“confidential information received and inquiries carried out” and
“information received and inquiries carried out,” respectively. The
Judge had asked the two Gardai concerned whether they believed
their information and each replied in the affirmative. The CCA was
satisfied that the District Judge had acted judicially on evidence that
was presented to him. He did not merely “rubber stamp” the
applications. The Court observed that a decision to issue a search
warrant may be quashed only if “no reasonable District Judge could
reasonably have formed the opinion that there was a basis for the
suspicion which entitled him to form the opinion which caused the
warrant to be issued.”90
C. Telephone interceptions
In People (DPP) v Dillon,91 the conduct of an investigating
Garda, who answered a call made to a seized mobile telephone, was
evaluated in the light of section 98 of the Postal and
Telecommunications Services Act, 1983, 92 which prohibits intercept-
ing telecommunication messages. On answering the call, the Garda
engaged in a conversation about drugs transactions with the
appellant, who clearly did not realise with whom he was conversing.
Section 98(5) defines “interception” as “listening to…any
telecommunications message without the agreement of the person on
whose behalf that message is transmitted … and of the person
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91 [2003] 1 I.L.R.M. 531.
92 The relevant portions of section 98 provide:
“(1) A person who—
( a ) intercepts or attempts to intercept, or
( b ) authorises, suffers or permits another person to intercept, or
( c ) does anything that will enable him or another person to intercept,
telecommunications messages being transmitted by the company or who discloses the
existence, substance or purport of any such message which has been intercepted or uses for
any purpose any information obtained from any such message shall be guilty of an offence.
(2) Subsection (1) shall not apply to any person who is acting—
( a ) (i) for the purpose of an investigation by a member of the Garda Síochána of a suspected
offence under section 13 of the Post Office (Amendment) Act, 1951 (which refers to
telecommunications messages of an obscene, menacing or similar character) on the complaint
of a person claiming to have received such a message, or
(ii) in pursuance of a direction issued by the Minister under section 110, or
(iii) under other lawful authority, or
( b ) in the course of and to the extent required by his operating duties or duties for or in
connection with the installation or maintenance of a line, apparatus or equipment for the
transmission of telecommunications messages by the company.
(5) In this section, ‘interception’ means listening to, or recording by any means, or acquiring
the substance or purport of, any telecommunications message without the agreement of the
person on whose behalf that message is transmitted by the company and of the person
intended by him to receive that message.”
intended by him to receive that message.” The CCA interpreted that
provision in the light of the whole section and the general framework
of the Act. The Court concluded that listening to a telephone
conversation without the relevant agreements is unlawful and that
the onus rests on the party that has to establish that there were such
agreements, which, in this case, was the prosecution. The Court
further held that the identity of the person whom the caller intended
to receive the message is a central feature of the agreement, without
which the act of listening is an “interception.” The Court went on to
note that the 1983 Act does not distinguish between calls made for
a criminal purpose and other calls, nor does it establish an
exemption for Gardai. It concluded that the action in this case was
not mandated by law. In holding that evidence of the telephone
conversation should have been excluded, the Court rejected the
argument that the interception involved the breach of a legal right
rather than a constitutional right.93
D. Duplicity
The general rule that a count should not charge more than
one offence is easily stated, but is more difficult to apply in practice.
The dividing line between a duplicitous count and one which charges
a single offence by alleging alternate means of commission is often
indistinct. The CCA has observed that the matter typically falls to be
decided on a case-by-case basis.94
Under section 31 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1994, the
offence of money laundering consists of a number of defined
activities in relation to the “proceeds of drug trafficking or other
criminal activity.”95 In People (DPP) v Meehan,96 the appellant faced
a series of counts, each charging him with laundering money that
was derived initially from cigarette smuggling and later from drug
trafficking. The Court was called on to determine whether section 31
creates two distinct offences or merely describes two different means
of committing the one offence. An examination of the 1994 Act as a
whole, including the definitions adopted and the special regime of
confiscation orders following a drug trafficking conviction,
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94 See e.g. People (DPP) v Walsh 11 February 2002 (ex temp); People (DPP) v Fagan 21 March
2003 (ex temp).
95 See note 40.
96 27 June 2002.
persuaded the Court that the legislation effectively drew a vital
distinction between drug trafficking and other criminal activity.
Accordingly, the CCA held that section 31 created two offences, - in
effect laundering the proceeds of drug trafficking and laundering the
proceeds of other criminal activity.  It followed that each of the
counts on which the appellant was charged was bad for duplicity. 
E. Joinder of charges
In People (DPP) v Nevin,97 the applicant had been charged
with one count of murder and three counts of solicitation of murder.
The latter offences were alleged to have involved three different men
and to have occurred over a six to seven year period. The trial judge’s
decision to refuse to sever the solicitation counts from the murder
count was upheld by the CCA. The Court stated that the test was
whether the charges had a common factual origin and it did not
consider the separation in time a bar to the joinder of the charges.
The Court concluded that the offences had similar features which
established a prima facie case for joinder and it was satisfied the trial
judge had correctly exercised her discretion not to order that the
charges be severed.
F. Separate Trials
The CCA considered the issue of ordering separate trials in
People (DPP) v LG,98 where the accused was charged with sexual
offences against his two sisters. The Court held that there is no
inflexible rule and observed that the matter lies within the discretion
of the trial judge. In cases of this type, it is not unlikely that evidence
concerning one complainant will be inadmissible in respect of other
complainants. In such circumstances, the Court noted, it is
preferable that the trial judge makes a ruling on admissibility at the
time of the application for separate trials. In the instant case, no such
ruling had been made but, given that the evidence was admissible in
respect of both complainants, the Court concluded that the trial
judge had properly exercised his discretion. However, the CCA went
on to note that it was incumbent on the trial judge to give a clear
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97 [2003] 3 I.R. 321.
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direction to the jury that they should consider the evidence in respect
of the counts relating to the first complainant separately from the
evidence relating to the counts concerning the second complainant.
G. Jury
In People (DPP) v Kenny,99 the Court held that a trial judge
enjoys discretion as to how he or she receives communications from
members of the jury panel. In empanelling a jury, the judge has a
duty to act in “a fair manner and proceed with due process.”100 In the
instant case, the trial judge’s decision to hold private conversations
with members of the panel was an appropriate exercise of his
discretion. In People (DPP) v Lindsey,101 a juror revealed that he
recognised the applicant from having seen him around the town.
Having assessed the demeanour of the juror and having canvassed
the matter with both counsel, the trial judge decided not to discharge
the jury. The Court held that, in the circumstances, it would not
intervene with the judge’s exercise of discretion.
In People (DPP) v O’Brien,102 it emerged during the trial that
a juror was acquainted with an investigating Garda. The prosecution
proposed not to call the Garda, who gave evidence (in the absence of
the jury) as to the nature of his acquaintance with the juror.
Following discussion, the trial judge decided that the appropriate
course was to exclude the evidence of that witness and refused a
defence request to cross-examine him. The CCA concluded that this
course of action had adequately preserved the integrity of the trial
and it upheld the decision not to discharge the jury.
People (DPP) v Price and Stanners103 provides an example of
how an unforeseen incident, that might potentially disrupt a trial,
can be managed. In that case, a juror complained during the course
of the trial that one of the applicants had pulled up alongside her at
traffic lights, waved to her and blew smoke at her. While the
applicant denied this, defence counsel sought the discharge of the
jury on the grounds that the alleged incident would be on the minds
of the jury. The trial judge refused to accede to that request. On
recalling the jury, he did not indicate the applicant’s denial, but asked
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99 [2003] 4 I.R. 162.
100 Ibid., at 173.
101 [2004] I.E.C.C.A. 6.
102 17 June 2002.
103 [2004] I.E.C.C.A 26
if the foreman wished to say anything. It became clear that the jury
had discussed the incident and had requested that their names and
addresses should not be read out in court. Noting that the matter
must be considered in relation to both the subjective and objective
bias of jury members, the CCA concluded that the trial judge had
clearly explained the matter to the jury in his charge, thereby
negating any possibility of bias.
The conduct of the jury-keepers resulted in a conviction for
murder being overturned in People (DPP) v McDonagh.104 It became
clear that, having retired overnight to a hotel, the jury-keepers had
given the jury advice on how to proceed in their deliberations and
subsequently socialised with them. One of the jury-keepers ended up
alone in a bedroom with a female juror and there was some physical
contact: The juror complained of this conduct to the foreman the
following day. The CCA felt that it could not be satisfied that no
miscarriage of justice occurred in the circumstances. The test
adopted was whether a reasonable and fair-minded observer would
consider that there was a possibility that the juror might have been
unconsciously influenced by his or her personal experience.
In People (DPP) v Kenny,105 the trial judge recharged the jury,
after approximately seven hours deliberation. Within two hours of
the recharge, the jury returned a majority verdict. The CCA rejected
the contention that the two-hour period specified in section 25(3) of
the Criminal Justice Act, 1984106 should be taken to run from the
time of the recharge. Noting that the jury was “robust in its duty,”107
the Court concluded that a requirement to “reset the clock” could
not be read into section 25(3).
H. Charge to Jury
The CCA has emphasised the importance of charging a jury
in neutral terms which do not convey any impression that a
particular view should be taken of the evidence or the witnesses.108
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106 Section 25(3) provides:
“The court shall not accept a verdict by virtue of subsection (1) unless it appears to the court
that the jury have had such period of time for deliberation as the court thinks reasonable
having regard to the nature and complexity of the case; and the court shall not in any event
accept such a verdict unless it appears to the court that the jury have had at least two hours
for deliberation.”
107 [2003] 4 I.R. 162 at 176.
108 See e.g. People (DPP) v Ahern 20 March 2003.
The Court accepted that a charge to a jury might be factually and
legally correct, but that the tone of the charge and the language used
might be such as to render a conviction unsafe. Thus, a trial judge’s
remarks which appear to give a seal of approval to a crucial witness
carry the danger that those words might unduly influence the jury.
Equally, the use of language that might be taken to suggest that the
accused is a guilty person seeking to avoid the consequences of his
or her conduct will render a conviction unsafe.109
The importance of explaining the presumption of innocence
to the jury was central to the decision in People (DPP) v DO’T.110
The Court observed that:111
[t]he presumption of innocence … is not only a right
in itself: it is the basis of other aspects of a trial in due
course of law at common law. The rule that,
generally speaking, the prosecution bears the burden
of proving all the elements of the offence necessary to
establish guilt is a corollary of the presumption. To
state the incidence of the burden of proof without
indicating its basis in the presumption is to risk
understating its importance and perhaps relegating it
to the status of a mere technical rule. The
presumption is the basis of the rule as to the burden
of proof and not merely an alternative way of stating
it. The presumption also exists, and has effect, in
ways other than simply dictating the incidence of the
burden of proof at the trial.
In the Court’s view, the presumption should be explained to
the jury and the charge should include:112
“…a statement that the presumption is that every
accused person is innocent until a jury is satisfied to
the contrary to the appropriate standard and that this
presumption is the basic, constitutionally guaranteed,
condition of a trial in due course of law [followed by]
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109 People (DPP) v Hourigan and O’Donovan [2004] I.E.C.C.A. 8; see also People (DPP) v
Slattery 4 February 2004 (ex temp).
110 [2003] 4 I.R. 286.
111 Ibid., at 290.
112 Ibid., at 292.
… instruction as to the onus of proof, described as a
consequence of that presumption to which every
accused is entitled.”
The Court held that a recharge (the trial judge having
omitted to mention the presumption in the original charge) in which
the presumption was “no more than mentioned”113 without being
explained and which omitted to elaborate on the relationship
between the presumption and the rules of evidence the jury was
being asked to apply, was inadequate. It was also held to be
erroneous to suggest that the onus of proof lay with the prosecution
where there was a “difference” between the parties. Such a statement
could be taken to suggest that the burden on the prosecution is
limited or that the accused was expected to establish such a
difference before the prosecution was called on to prove its case.
In People (DPP) v DO’S,114 the Court held that a charge to
the jury that omitted express reference to giving the accused the
“benefit of the doubt” was not flawed since the jury had been given
a full explanation of the principles involved and their role as sole
arbiters of fact had been emphasised.115 In People (DPP) v Price and
Stanners,116 the Court stated that it was “unhelpful” to provide
examples to illustrate the meaning of “beyond reasonable doubt.” In
the circumstances of the case, the Court allowed the conviction to
stand as it concluded that there was no danger that the jury would
have been confused. 
A point of significant practical importance was considered in
People (DPP) v Reid; People (DPP) v Kirwan,117 where the CCA held
to be erroneous a charge to the effect that if two equal views of the
evidence were open, the one that is more favourable to the accused
should be taken. Citing DPP v Byrne,118 the CCA observed that the
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115 See also People (DPP) v McDonnell 22 April 2002 (ex temp); People (DPP) v O’Connor 29
July 2002: “[t]he judge does not have to repeat the references to proof beyond a reasonable
doubt as a mantra in respect of every part of the case”. On the other hand the CCA has made
it clear that the jury must be properly charged in relation to the benefit of doubt and the onus
of proof: People (DPP) v Padden and Padden 20 March 2002 (ex temp).
116 [2004] I.E.C.C.A 26. 
117 [2004] 1 I.R. 392.
118 [1974] I.R. 1; see also DPP v Wallace, Court of Criminal Appeal, unreported, 30 April
2001. In contrast, in People (DPP) v Cronin [2003] 3 I.R. 377 the charge on drawing of
inferences was found to be incomplete but this was held not to render the verdict unsafe and
the CCA observed that defence counsel has not taken exception to it at the time.
law is that if two views are possible, even where one of them is less
probable, the one that is more favourable to the accused should be
taken. The Court explained the matter:119
The starting point for the relevant exercise may
accurately be described in the phrase ‘if two views are
open’ or ‘if two views are possible’ … The difference
[from the phrase ‘if two views are equal’] is quite a
stark one: two views may be open, even if one of
them is very much less probable than the other. But if
the two views must be ‘equal’, that necessarily
implies that the inference most favourable to the
accused should not be drawn even if it is only slightly
less probable than the inference favouring the
prosecution. This is to introduce the civil evidential
standard at least into some part of the case.
The principles governing the silence of an accused while he
or she was in custody were outlined a number of years ago in People
(DPP) v Finnerty.120 In People (DPP) v McDermott,121 the Court,
applying the Finnerty judgment, held that a trial judge should not
have commented to the jury on the fact of the accused’s silence. The
force of Finnerty was also felt in People (DPP) v McCowan,122 where
the CCA condemned the leading of evidence regarding the
appellant’s refusal to answer police questions on the advice of his
solicitor. The Court remarked that Finnerty is “very simple to
observe and [the Court] would be gravely perturbed if it were
thought that it could be departed from at the expense of a rebuke or
comment by this court but that it would not be taken seriously
beyond that.”123
In a relatively straightforward case, it is sufficient for the trial
judge to explain the legal principles involved without going into the
evidence in detail.124 However, in more difficult cases, more might be
required, a point that emerges from People (DPP) v Dickey.125 There,
the accused, who was charged with importation and possession of
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121 17 June 2002.
122 [2003] 4 I.R. 349.
123 Ibid., at 351.
124 See e.g. People (DPP) v Hogan 12 July 2004.
125 7 March 2003.
drugs, raised a defence of duress. The trial judge’s direction consisted
principally of reading an extract from the judgment in People (AG)
v Whelan126 by way of explaining the legal principles involved. The
applicant took no issue with the charge in relation to the legal
definition of duress, but contended that the charge was deficient in
that it did not detail the evidence that would support the defence.
The CCA agreed, noting that the defence rested on a “difficult point
of law.” There was a danger that the jury would not have fully
understood which matters were to be considered in determining the
issue of duress.
In People (DPP) v Dunne,127 the trial judge did not explain
the plea of self-defence even though he had allowed the defence to
raise that issue. No requisition had been made by either side, but the
CCA, in quashing the conviction, observed that there is an
obligation on prosecution counsel to advise the trial judge where
there has been such an omission.
I. Delay
In People (DPP) v PO’C,128 the Court held that where an
accused seeks to prevent a trial on grounds of delay, the appropriate
remedy is to seek an order of prohibition (if the court of trial is an
inferior court) or an injunction restraining the DPP from proceeding
with the charges where the case is scheduled for the Central Criminal
Court.129 The CCA held that a trial judge did not have jurisdiction to
quash an indictment on the grounds of excessive delay. As it
happened, the Court felt that, even if it was wrong in that
conclusion, the applicant’s tardiness in raising the issue of delay was
fatal.
The decision in People (DPP) v PO’C was followed in People
(DPP) v LG130 in which the Court upheld the trial judge’s refusal to
withdraw the charges on the grounds of delay. However, in the
circumstances, the CCA concluded that the jury should have been
given adequate warning of the difficulties posed by the delay in
question (27 years). In particular, the trial judge should have drawn
the jury’s attention to the problems faced by the defence in preparing
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129 State (O’Connell) v Fawsitt [1986] I.R. 362 applied.
130 [2003] 2 I.R. 517.
for the trial. The Court also held that the warning in relation to
delay should be separate from any warning the trial judge chooses to
give in relation to corroboration.
J. Adverse Media Publicity
It is sometimes argued that the effect of adverse publicity is
such that the accused will not receive a fair trial. This was one of the
issues raised in People (DPP) v Nevin,131 where it was contended that
the trial judge should have acceded to a defence request to delay
proceedings until the effects of adverse media coverage had faded.
The CCA accepted that, in some circumstances, such publicity would
justify the stopping of a trial, but felt that the matter fell within the
discretion of the trial judge. The Court would not interfere unless it
were clearly shown that a trial judge wrongly exercised his or her
discretion. In the instant case, the trial judge banned press comment
on the applicant’s appearance and demeanour and the publication of
photographs of her. The CCA held that the trial judge had made
appropriate rulings and directions and agreed with her assessment
that, notwithstanding the conduct of the media, there was no real or
serious risk that the applicant would not get a fair trial.
K. Re-trials
In People (DPP) v GK,132 the Court held that the
fundamental constitutional principles of due process and fair
procedures demanded that an accused facing a re-trial be provided
with a transcript of the previous trial. It is not necessary that the
defence show inconsistencies in the evidence of a witness at the time
the application for a transcript is made.
L. Appeals: New Evidence
In People (DPP) v J,133 the CCA outlined the three conditions
that must be satisfied before new evidence may be admitted: (i) it
must be relevant; (ii) it must be credible; and (iii) it must have been
unavailable at the time of the original trial.
Section 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1993, which
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provides for applications to the CCA on the basis on new evidence
(“a new fact or a newly discovered fact [showing] that there has been
a miscarriage of justice”), has been invoked in several cases. In
People (DPP) v Callan,134 the Court held that the new “fact” must be
one that was relevant to the trial and the decision made by the trial
court. The applicant’s conduct in presenting a perjured version of
events to the court of trial and his decision not to make use of the
arguments now being advanced during his first appeal (in 1986)
were sufficient to convince the Court that the matter did not come
within section 2. There was no reasonable explanation offered by the
appellant as to why he did not rely on the facts now being invoked.
In People (DPP) v Redmond,135 the Court stated that an
objective assessment must be made of the new fact with a view to
determining whether the conviction was unsafe. In the instant case
there was a strong possibility that the new evidence would have
raised a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the appellant in the minds
of the jury.
It is clear from the decision in People (DPP) v Leacy136 that
the new fact must satisfy the ordinary criteria of admissibility.137 The
trial judge granted a certificate that the case was fit for appeal in the
light of new evidence that the mother of the child complainant
admitted to a third party that the applicant was not guilty of the
offences. The new witness was a solicitor who swore an affidavit and
it was sought to treat the contents of the affidavit as new facts. The
application was refused on the grounds that the new evidence was
hearsay and did not amount to a “newly discovered fact.”
On the other hand, in People (DPP) v McLoughlin,138 the
complainant in a rape trial testified that her friend had witnessed an
incident during which the applicant had acted aggressively towards
her (i.e., the complainant). The friend, who had denied this assertion
to the Gardai during the investigation, became aware of the
complainant’s evidence after the trial and swore an affidavit
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137 See also People (DPP) v Shortt (No 1) [2002] 2 I.R. 686: on an application for a certificate
under section 9 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1993 the CCA refused the DPP’s request to
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rebutting that testimony. The Court granted a re-trial on the basis of
this new evidence: the matter went to credibility which, in the
circumstances, was vital.
It was held in People (DPP) v Pringle (No 2)139 and People
(DPP) v Meleady and Grogan140 that the granting of a certificate of
a miscarriage of justice under section 9 does not automatically
follow from a successful application under section 2. In People
(DPP) v Shortt (No 2),141 an effort was made to confine the earlier
decisions to cases where the application was based on a “new fact”
rather than a “newly discovered fact.” In the latter instance, it was
argued that a section 9 certificate should issue automatically. This
contention was rejected by the CCA, which considered itself bound
by the principles in Pringle (No 2). However, the Court granted a
certificate on the strength of the newly discovered fact that a number
of documents, which would have been damaging to the principal
prosecution witness, were concealed by two Gardai. This conduct
amounted to a grave defect in the administration of justice.
V. SENTENCING
A. General Principles
The general philosophy of sentencing was reiterated by the
Court in People (DPP) v GD,142 where it stated:
Each case must depend on its special circumstances.
The appropriate sentence depends not only upon its
own facts but also upon the personal circumstances
of the accused. The sentence to be imposed is not the
appropriate sentence for the crime, but the
appropriate sentence for the crime because it has
been committed by that accused. The range of
possible penalties is dependant on those two factors.
It follows that sentencing judges must enjoy considerable
discretion in order properly to balance the factors alluded to by the
Court. As a corollary, the CCA has established that it will only alter
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139 [1997] I.R. 225.
140 [1995] I.R. 517.
141 [2002] 2 I.R. 696. 
142 [2004] I.E.C.C.A. 17.  See also People (DPP) v RB 8 April 2003 stating that it is the duty
of the trial judge to consider all the circumstances of the crime, the victim and the accused.
a sentence where it is satisfied that there was an error in principle: it
will not intervene solely on the ground that it would have been
disposed to giving a more lenient sentence.143
In People (DPP) v Cooney,144 the Court took the opportunity
to spell out several points of principle. First, it stressed the
elementary but important point that a criminal trial is a proceeding
between the People and an accused person, not between the victims
and the accused. This has a relevance to sentencing where the danger
of being overly influenced by evidence of the victims must be
avoided. Second, the court considered it erroneous to treat stabbing
cases as a special category as far as sentencing for manslaughter is
concerned. Third, it observed that while a trial judge is under no
obligation to provide reasons for the sentence he or she is imposing,
it is a desirable practice to state reasons because “[p]ublic confidence
in the criminal justice system is enhanced when reasons for sentences
are clearly expressed.”145
B. Evidence of Other Offences
The Court has indicated that a sentence ought to be confined
to the offences established against the accused and that it is
erroneous to base a sentence on evidence of an accused’s general
reputation. In People (DPP) v McManus,146 the Court held that the
trial judge erred in admitting general opinion evidence of a Garda
witness which indicated that the accused was involved in more
serious crime.147 Similarly, in People (DPP) v Gilligan,148 the Court
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143 People (DPP) v Halloran 21 October 2002. People (DPP) v GF 25 May 2004: CCA
considered the sentence (10 years for rape under section 4) to be high but not so high as to
have been an error of principle. However, in some cases a sentence has been varied even where
the CCA concluded that there was no error in principle: see e.g. People (DPP) v O’Neill 21
October 2002; People (DPP) v Cooke 27 May 2004: no error in principle but sentence
backdated to time appellant was taken into custody.
144 [2004] I.E.C.C.A. 19. 
145 See also People (DPP) v Dekker 25 November 2002 (ex temp) where the failure of a trial
judge to refer to the appellant’s guilty plea was described as “unusual and undesirable”. It
was held that there had been an error of principle. But in People (DPP) v Ji Guang and others
26 May 2004 (ex temp) the CCA rejected the contention that the trial judge should have set
out the mitigating factors accepted and indicated the weight being attributed to each: the
Court felt disinclined to impose such a requirement on trial judges.
146 21 March 2003.
147 See also People (DPP) v Furlong 20 December 2002.  The trial judge was held to have erred
in acting on opinion evidence that the appellant was believed to be a main supplier of
cannabis; People (DPP) v O’Connell 17 December 2002; People (DPP) v O’Loughlin 17
December 2003. The trial judge erred in acting on Garda opinion that the appellant was
associated with major figures in the drugs trade which was not supported by evidence.
148 12 November 2003; the appeal against conviction which was rejected by the Court on 8
August 2003 is discussed in text at notes 47-48.
held that the Special Criminal Court erred, in principle, in not
confining itself to the individual charges proved against the accused.
However, the CCA accepted that evidence of an accused’s
involvement in other offences might be relevant and in this regard it
drew an important distinction:
…in many cases there may be a narrow dividing line
between sentencing for offences for which there has
been no conviction and taking into account
surrounding circumstances, which include evidence
of other offences, in determining the proper sentence
for offences for which there has been a conviction. It
is important that courts should scrupulously respect
this dividing line.
In Gilligan, the CCA found that a sentence of 28 years’
imprisonment for possession of drugs for the purpose of supply was
disproportionate to the sentences imposed on the appellant’s
associates, given the lack of evidence that the appellant was the gang
leader.149
In People (DPP) v Flaherty,150 a Garda witness described the
accused, who was convicted on a number of counts of buggery,
attempted buggery and indecent assault, as an active paedophile and
a danger to the public. In reducing the sentences imposed, (from nine
years and four years concurrent to seven years and four years
concurrent) the CCA observed that, while it would be permissible to
take an accused’s bad character and violent disposition into account,
undue weight had been attached to that evidence and the sentence
had included a preventive element. On the other hand, in People
(DPP) v Healy,151 the Court held that the trial judge was entitled to
take account of psychiatric evidence of the danger that the applicant
would re-offend, a view that was reinforced by the fact that the
accused committed a similar offence during the Garda investigation.
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149 See also People (DPP) v O’Donoghue 15 April 2002.  The applicant acknowledged that his
possession of drugs had not been an isolated incident and Garda evidence was admitted that
he had been dealing in drugs for a longer period than he confessed; CCA held that trial judge
was correct to take all the circumstances into consideration, including his admission to Gardai
that he had been a courier.
150 20 December 2002 (ex temp).
151 19 April 2004.
C. Relevant Factors in Sentencing
Many appeals against sentence were disposed by means of ex
tempore decisions from which certain broad themes can be
identified. In the period under review, the CCA has identified various
mitigating factors that should be taken into account in sentencing:
prior good character; youth; old age; poor health; mild mental
handicap; mental disorder; psychiatric problems; low intelligence;
physical disability; the offender’s childhood experience; the fact that
the accused is a foreign national; an early guilty plea and genuine
remorse;152 degree of co-operation with the Gardai; the payment of
compensation; the likelihood of not re-offending; character
references; the accused’s good conduct in the time between the
commission of the offence and the trial; the fact that the accused has
taken steps to deal with an alcohol or drug addiction; the fact that
the accused was persuaded by his employer to become involved in
illegal resistance to a threat of extortion; and the fact that the
criminal act was not premeditated.
The sentence imposed on a co-accused might also be
relevant, the Court taking the view that equal situations should be
treated equally.153 The effect that a custodial sentence might have on
innocent family members has been cited in judgments and, in one
case, the fact that an accused had adopted two Romanian orphans
was found to be relevant. The Court also reduced a sentence for
arson where the appellant had checked the premises to ensure that
nobody was present prior to setting the fire. The Court has also
expressed the view that it is not desirable that a sentence be
suspended for a longer period than the sentence itself.154
On the other hand, the Court has held that it is appropriate
to take account of an accused’s continuing criminal career155 and of
the fact that an accused has not availed of opportunities afforded to
him previously.156 Nevertheless, the CCA has reduced a seven-year
sentence to one of five years on the ground that the original sentence
represented a “big jump” on the longest sentence of six months that
the applicant had previously served.157
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152 On the other hand the CCA has refused to take a belated acceptance of responsibility into
account: see People (DPP) v Jacobs 15 December 2003 (ex temp). 
153 See People (DPP) v Duffy [2003] 2 I.R. 192.
154 People (DPP) v Hogan 4 March 2002 (ex temp).
155 People (DPP) v Ryan 17 December 2002; see also People (DPP) v O’Donoghue 27 May
2004.
156 People (DPP) v Horgan 25 May 2004.
157 People (DPP) v Dutton 5 February 2004 (ex temp).
The Court has indicated, in some decisions, that a custodial
sentence is normally warranted for offences involving violence or the
threat of violence (such as robbery and assault with intent to rob)
and for a vicious and premeditated assault. Thus, in People (DPP) v
Olden,158 the Court upheld a three-year sentence for an assault with
a knife, committed by the applicant on his girlfriend. The trial
judge’s initial view had been to impose the maximum sentence of five
years, but reduced it to take account of a guilty plea and the CCA
found that the sentence was not unduly harsh. These rulings can be
contrasted with other decisions where there was less of an emphasis
on the custodial dimension.159
In some assault cases, a suspended sentenced was approved
in circumstances where compensation was paid to the victim.160 The
jurisdiction to order the payment of compensation was queried in
People (DPP) v Johnson.161 The appellant was sentenced to three
years with the trial judge ordering that compensation, amounting to
£4,903 which he had brought to court, be paid to the victim without
prejudice to any civil remedy. The CCA did not deal with the point
raised but, in reducing the sentence to one year, it held that the trial
judge should have given the appellant credit, inter alia, for the
compensation.162
The question of suspending a custodial sentence imposed on
an elderly person in poor health has been considered. In People
(DPP) v JM,163 the appellant was sentenced to three year concurrent
sentence on 23 counts of indecent assault. The offences were
committed in the late 1940s and the appellant was a teacher in, and
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158 19 December 2002. See also People (DPP) v Power 19 January 2004 (ex temp): CCA
allowed DDP appeal by increasing a two-year sentence for aggravated sexual assault to three
years.
159 See People (DPP) v NY [2002] 4 I.R. 309 CCA suspending the balance of concurrent three-
year sentences for rape and rape under section 4: the trial judge was said to be in error for
having proceeded on the assumption that a custodial sentence was mandatory for all cases of
rape. In People (DPP) v Maher 18 December 2002 sentences of four and two years for rape
and sexual assault, respectively, were reduced to two years, with the last 14 months suspended
and one year with the last six months suspended: It was wrong in principle for the trial judge
to attach any great weight to People (DPP) v Tiernan [1988] I.R. 250, which suggested that a
custodial sentence is normally warranted for rape.
160 See e.g. People (DPP) v Connolly 5 February 2002. 
161 17 December 2002.
162 In People (DPP) v Garvey 26 January 2004 (ex temp) the CCA upheld a fine of ¤1,000 for
assault causing harm and endangerment: offences were committed during  a dispute between
two groups in a public house, there were no lasting injuries and the injured party withdrew the
complaint.
163 22 February 2002.
later principal of, the school attended by the victims. The CCA
considered that the lateness of the complaints and the delay in
bringing the case did not support a suspended sentence. The youth
of the victims and the position of trust occupied by the appellant
explained the delays involved. However, the appellant’s advanced
age and his physical and mental condition meant that a custodial
sentence would amount to a punishment of undue severity and a
suspension of the entire term was required. The principles in JM
were invoked in People (DPP) v PH,164 but, in this case, the CCA
found that a three-year sentence with the final year suspended was
justified.
The practice of ordering sentence reviews was condemned in
the decision of the Supreme Court in People (DPP) v Finn.165
However, the CCA has observed that orders made prior to Finn may
stand, and upheld a sentence of eights years, with a review after four
years, in People (DPP) v Kelly.166 In People (DPP) v McDonnell,167
the Court confirmed that the decision in Finn did not deprive
sentencing judges of the power to suspend portion of a sentence.
In several cases, the CCA has acknowledged that adverse
consequences which result from a conviction do not of themselves
justify a lenient sentence. In People (DPP) v Muldoon,168 the
applicant, who was convicted of offences under the Child Trafficking
and Pornography Act, 1998, was sentenced to two and a half years’
imprisonment with post-release supervision for 11 years. The trial
court also ordered that he be allowed access to a personal computer
and the Internet only under supervision. The CCA accepted that the
latter restriction severely curtailed the applicant’s right to earn a
livelihood (his work involved use of computers), but concluded that
he brought this state of affairs upon himself. Moreover, the restraint
was considered necessary to protect the public from serious harm. In
People (DPP) v Doherty,169 the Court, allowing a DPP appeal against
leniency, imposed a custodial sentence on a member of the Garda
Siochana found guilty of corruption. The Court observed that the
respondent’s loss of employment and status and the acute
embarrassment to his family were not mitigating factors, but were
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164 22 February 2002.
165 [2001] 2 I.R. 25.
166 23 July 2002.
167 17 December 2002.
168 7 July 2003.
169 29 April 2003.
the consequences of his conduct. However, in a seemingly
contrasting decision, People (DPP) v O’Meara,170 the CCA
suspended a custodial sentence on the grounds that the trial judge
had not taken sufficient account of the fact that a prison sentence
would end the applicant’s army career. And in People (DPP) v
Woods,171 the argument was advanced that the trial court should
have taken account of the fact that, being a Garda, the appellant,
who was convicted of harassment and telephone offences, would be
under greater pressure while imprisoned. The CCA accepted this
view and held that, although a custodial sentence was warranted,
part of the appellant’s sentence should be suspended.
In some cases, the Court has accepted that the original
sentence was appropriate, but that events subsequent to the trial
warrant a reduction. Thus, the quashing of a murder conviction has
been held to put a different light on sentences imposed for other
offences.172 In a similar vein, the fact that a drug addicted accused
had since rehabilitated and had resumed residing with her parents
was used to justify what would otherwise be considered a lenient
sentence.173
D. Consecutive Sentences
In People (DPP) v G McC,174 the appellant was sentenced to
concurrent sentences of life, 14 years and five years for rape, offences
under the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act, 1998 and sexual
and indecent assault. In imposing maximum sentences, the trial
judge remarked that he was entitled to impose consecutive sentences.
The CCA observed that the discretion in favour of consecutive
sentences was to be exercised sparingly. In reducing the sentences to
concurrent terms of 10 years, eight years, four years and three years,
the Court also stated that the totality principle was applicable to
ensure that the overall sentence was just.
In People (DPP) v McKenna (No 2),175 the CCA considered
consecutive sentences to be justified. The respondent, who was
convicted of a series of indecent assault and sexual assault offences
committed against his daughter, received three-year concurrent
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170 10 March 2003.
171 19 December 2002.
172 People (DPP) v Rose 13 March 2002 (ex temp); People (DPP) v Ward 10 October 2002 (ex
temp).
173 People (DPP) v Comerford 11 October 2002 (ex temp).
174 [2003] 3 I.R. 609.
175 [2002] 2 I.R. 345.
sentences. The CCA expressed the view that it would be an injustice
to the public not to impose consecutive sentences and that the trial
judge ought to have exercised his discretion accordingly. The Court
substituted sentences of three years on each count of sexual assault
to run consecutively on each count of indecent assault.
In People (DPP) v WN,176 the appellant was sentenced to
seven consecutive one-year terms of imprisonment on seven counts
of sexual assault, committed against two complainants. The CCA
found that, in the circumstances, this was a case where a consecutive
sentence would be appropriate: the accused committed the offences
against two teenage females over a period of years and his acts had
serious consequences. The Court concluded that, considering the
totality principle, a seven-year sentence would not be unjust.
However, it found that there was an error in the method employed
by the trial judge. The Court took the view that the appropriate
course was to start with the maximum sentence for the offence (in
this case five years) and then to discount for mitigating factors.  In
the Court’s view, the mitigating factors in this case merited a
reduction of eighteen months, with the result that the appropriate
sentence for the first count was one of three and a half years. Similar
sentences, to run concurrently, were imposed in respect of the other
counts against the same complainant. The Court also imposed
concurrent three and a half year sentences on the remaining two
counts in respect of the offences committed against the second
complainant. However, the Court was satisfied that it was
appropriate to make the latter sentences consecutive to the sentences
imposed in respect of the first complainant.177 The net result was that
the total sentence imposed remained the same, albeit that the seven
one-year consecutive sentences were replaced by two groups of
consecutive sentences of three and a half years each.
Consecutive sentences posed a different problem in People
(DPP) v Whelan178 where the appellant was sentenced to 15 years’
imprisonment for attempted murder, consecutive on a life sentence
for murder. The Court held that, as a matter of law, it was not
possible to have a determinate sentence following a life sentence.
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176 20 November 2003.
177 People (DPP) v TB [1996] I.R. 294 applied.  
178 [2003] 4 I.R. 355.
Reversing the order of the sentences solved the problem in this case.
Section 11 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1984179 provides for
mandatory consecutive sentences for an accused whose offences
were committed while he or she was on bail in respect of an earlier
charge. In People (DPP) v Cole,180 the Court noted that the
obligation to impose consecutive sentences is not cumulative. It also
held that for section 11 to apply, the trial court must receive actual
evidence of the arrest, charge and release of the accused on bail and
that it is the duty of the prosecution to draw the court’s attention to
this legislative provision. The Court has also applied the principle of
totality to sentencing for bail offences.181
In People (DPP) v Robinson,182 the Court was required to
consider the meaning of “previous offence” in section 11. The
particular problem in this case was that the sequence of dates on
which the applicant was sentenced for three groups of offences did
not correspond with the order in which they were committed.  In
fact, the order in which groups 1, 2 and 3 came before the court was
1, 3 and 2. The Court held that “previous offence” means “an
offence previous to the offence for which he is being sentenced” and
could not be taken to refer to the order in which sentences were
imposed. Thus, when the applicant came to be sentenced in the final
hearing for offences which were committed on a date prior to those
for which he had been previously sentenced, section 11 did not
apply. The CCA also rejected the prosecution invitation to alter the
sequence in which consecutive sentences would be served, as that
option would not have been open to the trial court. In People (DPP)
v Byrne,183 it was held that the statutory obligation to impose
consecutive sentences operates only in relation to the offences the
accused committed while on bail, not to all offences of which he or
she is charged. The CCA also referred to the discretion a sentencing
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179 Section 11 reads: “(1) Any sentence of imprisonment passed on a person for an offence
committed after the commencement of this section while he was on bail shall be consecutive
on any sentence passed on him for a previous offence or, if he is sentenced in respect of two or
more previous offences, on the sentence last due to expire, so however that, where two or more
consecutive sentences as required by this section are passed by the District Court, the aggregate
term of imprisonment in respect of those consecutive sentences shall not exceed two years.”
180 31 July 2003.
181 People (DPP) v Hogan 17 December 2002. In People (DPP) v Lundon 19 April 2004 the
CCA, allowing a DPP appeal, imposed a consecutive element for an offence committed while
the accused was on bail.
182 20 December 2002.
183 23 July 2002.
judge enjoys at common law to order consecutive sentences, but
noted that in the instant case there was no indication that the trial
judge sought to rely on that power.
An appeal by the DPP against leniency was successful in
People (DPP) v Doyle.184 In that case, the offences on counts 2 and
3 (robbery and possession of an imitation firearm, respectively) were
committed while the accused was on bail, pending his trial on the
first count (attempted robbery). As a result, a consecutive sentence
was obligatory on counts 2 and 3. For this reason, the trial judge
reduced the sentence he would have otherwise imposed on the first
count, from three years’ imprisonment to one year, in order to avoid
the consequences that would have ensued from consecutive
sentences. The CCA held that it was inappropriate to seek to
eliminate the consequences of consecutive sentencing, which were
mandated by legislation and, accordingly, it restored the three year
sentence on the first count. 
E. Guilty Pleas and Maximum Sentences
Section 29(2) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1999185 authorises
the imposition of a maximum sentence on an accused who pleads
guilty if there are exceptional circumstances which warrant that
sentence. The matter was considered in People (DPP) v CD,186 where
the applicant had pleaded guilty to ten sample counts of rape and
two of sexual assault, there having been 153 counts on the
indictment. The offences had been committed over a 20-year period
against his four daughters. The case was described as one involving
a systematic and brutal pattern of sexual interference by a person in
total control. The accused was sentenced to life imprisonment on the
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184 [2004] I.E.C.C.A. 5. In People (DPP) v Tighe [2004] I.E.C.C.A. 4, the CCA upheld a three-
year sentence on the applicant who had acted as lookout for Doyle: t he trial court had been
informed of the DPP’s intention to appeal the sentences given to the other offenders but the
CCA was satisfied that the applicant was sentenced without regard to the sentences imposed
on his accomplices and that there was no error in principle.
185 The relevant provisions in section 29 state: 
“(1) In determining what sentence to pass on a person who has pleaded guilty to an offence,
other than an offence for which the sentence is fixed by law, a court, if it considers it
appropriate to do so, shall take into account—
(a) the stage in the proceedings for the offence at which the person indicated an intention to
plead guilty, and
(b) the circumstances in which this indication was given.
(2) To avoid doubt, it is hereby declared that subsection (1) shall not preclude a court from
passing the maximum sentence prescribed by law for an offence if, notwithstanding the plea
of guilty, the court is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances relating to the offence
which warrant the maximum sentence.”
186 21 May 2004.
rape charges and five years’ imprisonment on the sexual offence
charges, the sentences to run concurrently. The CCA upheld the
sentences. The Court observed that, although the trial judge had not
expressly invoked section 29(2), there was no error in principle in
imposing the maximum sentence if the trial judge is satisfied that the
relevant exceptional circumstances existed. Moreover, that
legislative provision outweighs any suggestion in earlier case law
that, as a matter of principle, an accused must be given a discount
for a guilty plea. As it happened, the Court observed that the
maximum sentence had not been imposed in this case. The life
sentences could have been imposed consecutively to the five-year
sentences, thereby postponing the applicant’s opportunity to avail of
the parole procedure.
F. DPP Appeals Against Leniency
In People (DPP) v GD,187 the CCA observed that the DPP
bears the onus of establishing that there had been an unduly lenient
sentence.188 The Court would only intervene if there had been a
“substantial departure” from what would be regarded as the
appropriate sentence. 
The operation of the 28 day time limit in section 2(2) of the
Criminal Justice Act, 1993 was considered in People (DPP) v
McKenna.189 The DPP’s office sought to lodge the appeal on the 28th
day after the respondent had been sentenced, but the CCA office
refused to accept the relevant documents, objecting to their form.
The revised documents were lodged the following day. The CCA
held that, for the purposes of the time limit, the delivery of notice of
application to appeal constituted the making of an application under
section 2(2) and, consequently, the appeal was within time.
G. Reactivated Sentences
The Court rejected the argument that a suspended sentence
could only be reactivated by the judge who had imposed the original
sentence. It also rejected the contention that a sentence could only be
partially reactivated.190 While the Court has indicated that the
2005]
A Review of the Jurisprudence of the Court of
Criminal Appeal 2002-2004:
Principles and General Themes
263
187 [2004] I.E.C.C.A. 17, 13 July 2004.
188 See also People (DPP) v Noonan 28 April 2003; People (DPP) v Keegan 28 April 2003:
DPP must show either a specific mistake has been made or more generally make the point that
the sentence was not long enough for the type of crime and must have argued the point during
the trial; People (DPP) v Connors 19 April 2004: onus is clearly on DPP to show a substantial
departure from the appropriate sentence.
189 6 February 2002.
190 People (DPP) v Stewart 12 January 2004.
reactivation is usually a matter for the trial court,191 it has reactivated
a suspended sentence on a DPP appeal where the accused breached
conditions by committing public order and criminal damage
offences.192
H. Offences Against the Person
The vexed question of minimum sentences for particular
categories of manslaughter was also considered in People (DPP) v
Kelly.193 At sentencing, the trial judge had spoken of a term of 20
years’ imprisonment as an appropriate deterrent for violent conduct.
When mitigating factors were taken into account, the applicant was
sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment. The CCA considered that
reference to a minimum sentence for manslaughter involved a
departure from established principles of sentencing and it substituted
a sentence of eight years’ imprisonment.194
A sentence of eight-and-a-half years’ imprisonment for
causing serious harm, contrary to section 4 of the Non-Fatal
Offences Against the Person Act, 1997, was upheld in People (DPP)
v Osborne.195  The applicant had argued that the sentence imposed
was as great as that which would have been imposed for
manslaughter had the victim died and that, as a matter of principle,
a lesser sentence should be imposed where death did not occur. The
Court rejected that contention stating:
While this argument is superficially attractive the
court is by no means satisfied that it is sound. The
sentence appropriate to the permanent destruction of
a young man's life may not necessarily in all
circumstances be less than the sentence which would
have been appropriate for manslaughter if death had
resulted from the same crime. The cliché “a fate
worse than death” comes to mind.
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191 People (DPP) v Gavin 15 May 2002 (ex temp). 
192 People (DPP) v Tyndall 28 January 2002 (ex temp).
193 [2005] 1 I.L.R.M. 19.
194 See also the companion case People (DPP) v Aherne [2004] I.E.C.C.A 13 where a similar
reference to a minimum 20 years’ for manslaughter was held to be erroneous in principle.
However, in this case the CCA, applying the proper approach, arrived at the same sentence as
the trial judge (10 years’ imprisonment). See also People (DPP) v Dillon 15 December 2003.
195 29 May 2003.
I. Section 15A of the Misuse of Drugs Act, 1977
The CCA has considered sentencing for section 15A offences
in a number of cases. The general approach to be adopted was
outlined in People (DPP) v Byrne,196 where a 10-year sentence was
upheld. The CCA rejected the argument that the trial judge had erred
in principle in failing to find that there were exceptional and specific
circumstances that warranted the mandatory sentence. The Court
concluded that the dominant consideration is that the Oireachtas
laid down a statutory minimum sentence and that judicial discretion
is accordingly circumscribed.197
The manner in which a trial judge should approach
sentencing under section 15A was also at issue in People (DPP) v
Power.198 The CCA held that the trial judge should have expressly
stated the sentence for the section 15A offences (the applicant had
also been convicted of other offences) and should have outlined the
benefit the applicant was being afforded for mitigating factors.199
However, the Court concluded that the seven-year sentence imposed
was not inappropriate.200
In People (DPP) v Galligan,201 it was held that being a first
time offender is an “exceptional and specific circumstance” which
justifies a departure from the mandatory minimum. The Court also
held that account should be taken of the accused’s genuine remorse.
In People (DPP) v Healy,202 the accused pleaded guilty and had
materially assisted the Gardai. The CCA held that insufficient
account had been taken of the mitigating circumstances and the
mandatory sentence was discounted to seven and a half years, with
the final two years suspended on terms to be decided, but to include
the appellant’s drug rehabilitation. In People (DPP) v Atkinson,203
the Court, reviewing the evidence, concluded that the trial judge
erred in not mitigating for co-operation. There was uncontested
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196 [2003] 4 I.R. 423.
197 See also People (DPP) v Rossi and Hellewell 18 November 2002: CCA observed that courts
must have serious regard to the statutory policy; People (DPP) v Barrett 12 July 2004
increasing a two-year suspended sentence to one of four years with no suspension.
198 8 October 2003.
199 See also People (DPP) v O’Loughlin 17 December 2003: “[i]t is unfortunate that the trial
judge did not also set out what credit he was giving for various matters.” 
200 See also People (DPP) v Dunne [2003] 4 IR 87: in upholding a seven-year sentence the CCA
rejected the contention that the trial judge had “undue regard” to the statutory minimum;
People (DPP) v Whelan 23 July 2002, upholding a sentence of six years.
201 23 July 2003.
202 8 October 2003.
203 19 April 2004.
evidence that the appellant cooperated fully with the Gardai. On the
other hand, in People (DPP) v Henry,204 the Court increased a four-
year sentence to one of six years on the ground that the trial judge
had been unduly lenient: the respondent had been given too much
credit for his guilty plea which was not entered until the day before
the trial. And, in People (DPP) v Heffernan,205 the Court allowed a
DPP appeal against leniency, increasing a two and a half year
sentence to one of four years.  In so doing, the Court found that the
trial judge had erred in reducing the sentence twice on the basis of
the same mitigating factors.
In People (DPP) v Botha,206 the applicant was sentenced to
five years’ imprisonment for possession of €52,000 worth of
cannabis. The CCA considered that there had been no error in
principle and opined that, if anything, the sentence had been
generous. The Court rejected the argument that the trial judge ought
to have categorised cannabis possession as less serious than
possession of other drugs. In this respect, the Court noted that
section 15A does not draw a distinction between cannabis and other
drugs.207 In any event, no mitigation could have been afforded to the
applicant, as he had been unaware of the nature of the drugs he was
carrying. 
The CCA dealt with the question of suspending a sentence or
part of a sentence on condition that a foreign national leave the
jurisdiction in People (DPP) v Alexiou.208 In that case, the DPP
appealed against a sentence of four years’ imprisonment suspended
on condition that the accused leave the State immediately, enter a
bond of good behaviour and not return to the country. The DPP
contended that the sentence was wrong in principle on several
grounds: that it could not be reactivated once the respondent left the
jurisdiction; that it was unduly lenient and would serve no deterrent
purpose; and that requiring a person to leave the country was an
executive function which lies beyond the judicial province. The
Court rejected these arguments, in particular concluding that the
trial judge did not perform an executive act, but applied a condition
to a sentence within the limits of judicial discretion. The Court did
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observe, however, that the preferred course would have been for the
trial judge to prescribe a definite period of time within which the
respondent was not to return to the State.209
Relatively lengthy sentences for drug possession have been
upheld in a number of ex tempore judgments.210 On the other hand,
the Court reduced a sentence of nine years’ imprisonment to one of
seven years, where the value of the drugs was marginally over
£10,000, stating that it could not be sure there was no error of
principle.211
J. Health and Safety Offences
In People (DPP) v Oran Pre Cast Ltd,212 the defendant
company was fined €500,000 for offences under the Health Safety
and Welfare at Work Act, 1989, which resulted in a fatality. In
reducing the sentence to a fine of €100,000, the CCA noted that the
fine imposed was far greater than that which had been imposed in
any similar case.213 It stated that “care and restraint” must be
observed when the power to fine is exercised and that the
defendant’s degree of fault should be the principal criterion in
determining the appropriate fine. The means of the company was
also deemed a relevant consideration.
VI. SECTION 29 CERTIFICATES
In People (DPP) v Kenny,214 the CCA, in refusing a section 29
2005]
A Review of the Jurisprudence of the Court of
Criminal Appeal 2002-2004:
Principles and General Themes
267
209 See also; People (DPP) v Vardacardis 20 January 2003 where the CCA upheld a sentence
of eight years, the last six and a half years of which were suspended on condition that the
accused leave the jurisdiction and not return during the suspension period. In contrast, six-year
sentences on foreign nationals were upheld in People (DPP) v Foster 15 May 2002 and People
(DPP) v Rossi and Hellewell 18 November 2002, while a 12-year sentence was upheld in
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different in that deportation was not made a condition of the suspension: ten years was
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appropriateness of incorporating a review into a sentence for a section 15A offence was not
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harm, respectively); People (DPP) v Coutts 4 November 2002 (ex temp) (eight years for
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211 People (DPP) v Murphy 10 October 2002 (ex temp).
212 16 December 2003 (ex temp).
213 See People (DPP) v Roseberry Construction Ltd [2003] 4 I.R. 338 where the CCA upheld
a fine of €200,000: the fact that a director of the company was separately fined did not amount
to double counting, give their distinct legal personalities.
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certificate, held that the onus rests on the applicant to establish that
a point of law of public importance is at issue and that it is desirable,
in the public interest, that the issue be referred to the Supreme Court.
The Court, drawing an important distinction, held that a matter that
is the subject of public debate, is not necessarily a matter of public
importance within the meaning of section 29.215 The Court also held
that an issue that had not been raised during the application for leave
to appeal could not be the subject of a section 29 certificate.216
In People (DPP) v K,217 the fact that the accused would not
benefit personally from a successful application was crucial. The
Court indicated that the point raised by the applicant, namely
whether a trial judge’s reference at sentencing stage to items in the
book of evidence without putting it before the parties, might benefit
from judicial clarification. However, as the appeal would not avail
the applicant, the Court being satisfied that his sentence was fully
justified, the application for a section 29 certificate was dismissed.
In People (DPP) v Sweetman,218 the Court, in refusing a
section 29 application, expressed its surprise that an application was
made when the substantive appeal to the CCA had been successful
and a retrial ordered. The Court entertained serious doubts as to
whether section 29 was intended to operate in such circumstances.
Those remarks were considered obiter in People (DPP) v
Campbell,219 where, despite the appeal being successful and a retrial
being ordered, the Court granted a section 29 certificate on the
question of whether a suppression order made under the Offences
Against the State Act, 1939 applies to the Real IRA. The Court took
the view that it was in the public interest that the issue be
authoritatively decided. It was doubtless considered relevant that the
accused’s retrial on a charge of membership of an illegal organisation
was ordered and the point, therefore, could not be considered moot.
As it happens, the Supreme Court refused to entertain the appeal on
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the grounds that to do so in circumstances where the CCA had
allowed an appeal and ordered a retrial would be to exercise a form
of consultative jurisdiction.220
In People (DPP) v Gilligan,221 the Court certified two points
relating to (i) the admissibility of evidence that may have been
obtained from witnesses under the State witness protection
programme and (ii) whether corroboration is required in respect of
the testimony of such witnesses and, if not, the appropriate test
concerning such witnesses.  
In People (DPP) v Diver,222 the Court certified a question
whether the trial judge had correctly exercised his discretion in
admitting a statement that had been taken in breach of custody
regulations when the applicant was held under section 4 of the
Criminal Justice Act, 1984.
VII. CONCLUSION
Between January 2002 and July 2004, the CCA was required
to adjudicate on a broad spectrum of issues relating to criminal law
and procedure, evidence and sentencing. Notwithstanding its large
caseload and varied composition, it is noteworthy that, despite dark
hints to the contrary, the Court has shown a striking degree of
consistency, applying general underlying principles with comparative
uniformity. This phenomenon might not be obvious at first sight, but
on detailed analysis, it emerges as a significant feature of the Court’s
judgments: what on first glance appears to be chaotic and disordered
is on closer scrutiny revealed as being more structured and ordered.
Given the professional demands imposed on them, judges and
practitioners are not well placed to conduct the exhaustive
examination of the CCA’s judgments that was undertaken in the
preparation of this paper. Instead, the task falls to academics and
researchers. To this end, the authors were fortunate in being
facilitated with access to the Court’s entire corpus of jurisprudence
in the review period, but it is acknowledged that few others enjoy
that facility. 
Improvements in law reporting and the use of electronic
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means of disseminating judicial decisions have contributed to a
richer body of legal information. However, a considerable portion of
the CCA’s output remains relatively inaccessible with the result that
trial judges and counsel are often required to operate in the dark. In
addition, inadequate access to the Court’s judgments can only serve
to prompt caricatured versions of the Court’s decision-making.
Better access to CCA judgments, perhaps best achieved by the
regular publication of new volumes of Frewen, is warranted. Such
measures would overcome the current information deficit and
coincidentally could be expected to contribute significantly to
enhancing the Court’s reputation. 
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